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HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM LEGAL TRANSPLANTS TO
FAIR TRANSLATION
JAMES M. DONOVAN*
ABSTRACT

The current regime of international human rights suffers from
three shortcomings: First, it has failed to adequately address the reality of
cultural diversity. Second, the formalized human rights treaties have
been ineffective in their ability to compel states to reform their
behaviors, and third, the uncontrolled growth in the number of human
rights weakens the impact of appeals to that standard.
Although treated as independent problems, this paper finds that
these three limitations are sufficiently linked such that a remedy to the
first will simultaneously resolve the others. Parts I and II of the paper
describe how the imposition of human rights values onto some societies

......ma.;; iutlii;t11niuJ~nd£)..d. bmmsJQJbi;; .~~.t~nt.1b.a1 . .thP§~ agtiQus . .JJJ19&nuim:<. .
the justification and support for human rights altogether. Against that
background is the challenge to find ways to realize the goods of the
human rights project without injuring those it intends to benefit.
Drawing extensively upon multiple disciplines-most notably
the philosophical exchange between Joseph Raz and Jeremy Waldron,
and the methodological suggestions of Alison Dundes Renteln and
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im-the article focuses on linking human
rights laws with local values. The result should be human rights
expressed in a manner in which all peoples can see themselves. If they
are no longer viewed as hegemonic intrusions, human rights will be
openly recognized and consequently more successfully observed.
Finally, the structural limitations of the suggested procedure will
necessarily support only a small number of human rights.
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INTRODUCTION

··· 11umaii rtglrts presl~ITtlworelrrted pmb'lems:· Frrst;·from·arrirritial · · ··
declaration in 1948, the number of formally identified as well as
informally claimed rights increases every year. 1 Framing all conflicts
through the vocabulary of human rights diminishes the vitality of other
forms of normative social regulation. When eveiything becomes a
question of law, the utility of custom, religion, and even etiquette, as well
as the ties of family and community, cease to play a meaningful role in
the organization of human societies. That price might be acceptable if
invocations of human rights achieved their goal of creating a better
world, with fewer abuses by states of their citizens than would otherwise
be the case. This result, however, has been questioned.
Although writers have remarked on the overuse of rights in
general and human rights in particular, their concerns have been
primarily normative, and thus fail to offer principled direction on how
this condition should be improved. Realizing that the overabundance of
human rights can lead to their reduced effectiveness is one thing, but it is
quite another to identify a reasoned manner by which to restrict their
number. Instead, ad hoc arguments defend why a particular proposal

1

See infra Section LB.
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should be rejected, without providing a generalized limitation on the
members of the class of human rights.
Only part of the ambivalence toward human rights endeavors
flows from their increasing mundanity. Claimed violations fail to trigger
the desired responses also because the recognized human rights do not
respect the diversity of values within the world's cultures. 2 Rather than
being the rights of humans qua humans, in practice the human rights can
be perceived as the ideals of Westerners projected outward as hegemonic
demands upon subordinate Others, 3 "an updated version of the civilizing
mission of Western imperialists. " 4
Any revisions to the human rights legal regime are certain to
meet strong resistance. The language of contemporary human rights
pervades modern societies to the extent that it has been called a "secular
religion. " 5 The label has become a ubiquitous shmihand for an ideal of
personal security and actualization that is not likely to immediately
disappear.
Taking the human rights regime with its acknowledged faults as
a persistent reality, this paper considers how it can be amended to better
achieve its promise to effectively guarantee core rights to all persons
.?witheHtre€J.uil,iagthey·sunen4ei:. what.th@y····beLie¥<3·mak@s.them·humarh······
The discussion asserts that the shmicomings of the current human rights
approach-too many, too parochial, too ineffective-are linked. A
method that better identifies norms that truly warrant the label human is
likely to yield a well-defined and limited roster of human rights. Less
frequent invocation may make the rights more powerful for being rare

2

3

4
5

This discussion treats "human rights," which refers to a generalized idea of a species of civilian
protections, as distinct from "the human rights," which refers to the pragmatic list of legally
recognized rights. That the two labels reference different concepts can be seen in the diverging
answers they receive in question form. "What are human rights?" invokes broad foundations of
human dignity and personal value, while "What are the human rights?" produces a list of specific
entitlements enumerated in ratified documents.
References to "the Other" tie into an extended tradition in sociology, philosophy, and political
geography wherein notions of the Self are defined and justified by contrast to an inferior Other.
See, e.g., SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX 6 (Vintage, 2011) ("The category of Other is
as original as consciousness itself."). See also DEREK GREGORY, THE COLONIAL PRESENT:
AFGHANISTAN, PALESTINE, IRAQ 48 (2004) ("During the 2000 presidential election campaign,
Bush had recalled growing up in a world where there was no doubt about the identity of
America's 'Other."').
ERIC POSNER, THE TWILIGHT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 68 (2014).
CHRISTOPHER NJ. ROBERTS, THE CONTENTIOUS HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 9 (2015).
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and uncontroversial, and perhaps thereby more effective. The following
sections propose such a method.
This paper begins with a review of the problem that must be
solved (Part I), as well as a critique of the cunent legal regime's
shortcomings regarding the value of human diversity (Part II). The
central premise is that if the idea of the human right is to do the work we
require, there needs to be a better procedure to recognize them. If they
are what they claim to be, human rights, their identification should spark
consensual recognition at some level by the widest range of human
societies. Otherwise, human rights will be human only in the hyperbolic
marketing sense that the "World Series" selects the planet's best baseball
teams or that "Miss Universe" chooses the most attractive woman in all
creation.
Part III draws upon the literature of legal anthropology and other
disciplines to describe methodologies designed to respect human
diversity. These techniques pinpoint the substantive content of human
rights by building upon the empirically identified moral tenets of a wide
range of societies. Such an approach views human rights as a conclusion
from observed cultural ideals rather than an abstracted aspiration that
. s.elec.tiv:ely.T. punishes.•so.me.groups..•.who. . Jail . . .to .... ac.hieYe.thos.e ...imposed....... .
goals.
The goal is that, in order to be relevant at the ground level,
human rights should be broadly convergent with the underlying values of
any successful group. There need not be one-to-one isomorphism, and
the indigenously recognized principle may need restatement into modern
legal statements. The end result, however, should be sensible to any
population. The alternative is that, instead of a translation of local
principles into a consistent language of international law, we witness a
power-based transplant of foreign obligations upon subordinate peoples.
Today, this grounded approach to human rights finds little
support among relevant policy brokers. One reason for the lack of uptake
may be that a critical piece of the description has been missing.
Negotiations that would smooth conflicts between disparate factions
within each society and between societies that have reached different
conclusions concerning appropriate norms cannot progress without an
independent standard to evaluate competing claims. Without a mutually
acceptable benchmark, no side can reasonably argue its position is better
than another. With little incentive for either side to yield in an argument
over fundamental principles, impasses are inevitable. To fill this gap,
Part IV proposes that panhuman intuitions about basic fairness can
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function as a shared prior ethical commitment, assisting in the resolution
of disagreements concerning the substantive content of human rights.
The rights identified by the criterion of cross-cultural recognition
will be few in number and phrased to protect against abuses rather than
aspire towards ideals. While these restrictions have independent merit to
prevent diluting overuse from the invocation of new and controversial
rights, the applied technique generates the desired result through a
nonarbitrary means.
I.

CONTEMPORARY HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE

Experts may prefer an ostensive definition that defines "human
rights" by pointing to clear exemplars, a method that limits the category
to the rights in relevant legal documents. Frankly, human rights are
whatever the United Nations determines. Most ordina1y speakers,
however, employ a more natural approach that builds upon the meanings
of the words themselves. Typical in this regard is the definition offered
by philosopher Richard Wasserstrom:
If any right is a human right, it must, I believe, have at least four vety

· · · geiie1:ara1araeterEiffcs:

fiil:sc·· ff

ffiusF ·te !Jossessecf f:JY: arr llliffiail···· ··

beings, as well as only by human beings. Second, because it is the
same right that all human beings possess, it must be possessed
equally by all human beings. Third, because human rights are
possessed by all human beings, we can rnle out as possible candidates
any of those rights which one might have in virtue of occupying any
particular status or relationship, such as that of parent, president, or
promisee. And fourth, if there are any human rights, they have the
additional characteristic of being assertable, in a manner of speaking,
'against the whole world.' That is to say, because they are rights that
are not possessed in virtue of any contingent status or relationship,
they are rights that can be claimed equally against any and every
other human being. 6

By any definition, human rights shoulder an unenviable burden.
This new legal creation emerged from the aftermath of the horrors of
6

Symposium, Richard Wasserstrom, Rights, Human Rights, and Racial Discrimination, 61 J.
PHIL. 628, 631-32 (1964). Wasserstrom's definition varies only slightly from that given by the
United Nations. See What Are Human Rights?, U.N. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM'R,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues!Pages/WhatareHumanRights.aspx (last visited Jan. 20, 2017)
("Human rights are rights inherent to all human beings, whatever our nationality, place of
residence, sex, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, language, or any other status. We are all
equally entitled to our human rights without discrimination. These rights are all interrelated,
interdependent and indivisible.").
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World War II. At the time they were committed, the Nazi atrocities were
not technically illegal due to the norms of state sovereignty under the
W estphalian international order. A state was generally permitted to treat
its own citizens however it wished. 7 Human rights aspire to pierce this
veil of state immunity from outside interventions by providing an
unquestioned and unquestionable floor of protections for every citizen
from ce1iain state actions.
To be effective, human rights must be unchallenged in the broad
strokes, with disagreement limited only to whether a contested action
falls within the forbidden category. To create this impact, "universal
human rights in their dominant register (i.e., the one expressed through
instruments like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights [UDHR]),
are above politics, before culture, and, quite literally, outside ofhistory." 8
Against mandates of such authority a state could not, for example, asse1i
a right to tmiure political prisoners by arguing that these individuals
were criminals, not political prisoners, and that in any event they were
being subjected only to "enhanced interrogation," and not torture. 9
Invocation of human rights serves as a shield against aggression
by state actors, as hump in arguments against which no higher principle

..can.be. . imwked, . and.as . a . . bur.den:.shiftertbai.nut.s. . it. JlP.QnJhe.QJh.er. . Par!y
to defend its actions. Although legalistic line-drawing frays the
protective cloak this jurisprudential creation throws around vulnerable
persons, the outcome presumably results in a more tempered selfrestraint by governments than had previously been the case.
One need not question whatever good has flowed from the
international regime of human rights to notice that its benefits and
burdens have not been evenly distributed. While marketed as a high
standard for all, the contents appear to repackage values already held by
some and then employed as a critical lash against others, rather than

7

8

9

JACK DONNELLY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 28-29 (1993) ("International relations is
structured around the legal fiction that states have exclusive jurisdiction over their territory, its
occupants and resources, and the events that take place there.").
Mark Goodale, The Power of Right(s): Tracking Empires of Law and New Modes of Social
Resistance in Bolivia (and Elsewhere), in THE PRACTICE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: TRACKING LAW
BETWEEN THE GLOBAL AND THE LOCAL 130, 144 (Mark Goodale & Sally Engle Merry eds.,
2007).
E.g., Talal Asad, On Torture, or Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Punishment, in HUMAN
RIGHTS, CULTURE & CONTEXT: ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 111, 120 (Richard A. Wilson
ed., 1997) ("[T]he many liberal-democratic governments that have employed torture have
attempted to do so in secret. And sometimes they have been concerned to redefine legally the
category of pain-producing treatment in an attempt to avoid the label 'tmture. '").
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applied to more local demands. As noted by one legal historian, under
American exceptionalism human rights are openly looked upon as
"export commodities-goods shipped off to others in faraway places, but
rarely considered fit for domestic consumption." 10
In the meantime, those in "faraway places" may not share the
view that the demands being made are good or right, and may even think
the opposite. While we may be conditioned to reflexively regard such
pushback as ill-considered, its existence should cause us to pause and
inquire how these norms came to have the content they do, and why they
are labeled as "human" rights rather than civil or political rights. 11 When
humans fail to recognize the relevance of human rights we tend to
criticize the humans as barbarians or inhumane, when perhaps we should
reconsider the latent messages of those proclaimed human rights.
Before argument can be made that changes are required to our
approach to human rights, the case must be made that a genuine problem
exists. The following sections argue that even if we grant that the initial
vision within the UDHR was sufficiently limited to the most general
standards of acceptable restrictions on state actors, latter accretions
impose ever more exacting demands that realize decreasing benefits .
..... G;g11fliet..hetwee&··thes0tep-dewn/draftingsBfergafil.z;ational·eemmittees·
and the ground level lifeways of peoples has become unavoidable.
Continuing on the present course will either result in the delegitimization
of the human rights project altogether because it has expanded so far
beyond its original purpose that it cannot bear the weight of dictating a
broad suite of rules for a planet, or lead to nonnative homogeneity
through the demise of alternative understandings of the goods of human
living.

10

ROBERTS, supra note 5, at 121. See also STEPHEN HOPGOOD, THE ENDTIMES OF HUMAN RIGHTS
97 (2013) (citing Louis Henkin) ("The American public was, by and large, a paying audience
rather than a membership constituency for global rights. They rarely if ever sought international
protection for domestic 'human rights' abuses, and this deeply nationalist conception of the
civil/human rights distinction persists. Human rights were, in effect, foreign policy for nonAmericans. ").
n Goodale reminds us of the qualitative difference between civil and human rights. MARK
GOODALE, SURRENDERING TO UTOPIA: AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 29-30 (2009)
("[C]ivil rights were understood in a quite different way than human rights, within a different
system of political and legal legitimacy, and anchored in a different set of assumptions about
human nature and the foundation of citizenship.").
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A. TOP-DOWN ORIGINS OF HR REGIM
Human rights are a legal and philosophical chimera. To receive
at least a formal show of submission they must appear to be in some
sense antecedent to and superior to the sovereignty of nation-states. If
that were not the case, any renegade state could with impunity declare
itself exempt from whatever nonn against which it was currently chafing.
Underneath the popular image of a supranational power lies a
much messier reality. While giving the appearance of having been only
recognized, human rights are, in fact, created. They are fonnal
enactments of international law, hammered out over years of minute
craftsmanship until a consensus document emerges that is in the end only
selectively :ratified. As is true of most legislative instruments, the final
compromise may only vaguely resemble the initial broad aspirational
intent. Despite springing from this most artificial and contrived of
processes, the outcome will nonetheless be proclaimed bearing the
honorific of "human right."
Little attention has been directed toward the significance of
applying the label "human right." To the extent that the fulfillment of the
......... Jc'.u.ie;.s ..o.bjectiv.es....i:equi1:e.s ...noL. only....gov.ernmentaL. compliance but . als~1.
uptake by the general population, calling an obligation a "human
right"-:rather than "the latest demand for conformity issued out of
Geneva or New York"-makes all the difference. Even when aware of
the rule's artificial genesis, the lay audience relies upon the myth that the
pronouncements embody natural entailments of being "human," which
places them beyond the reach of contrary demands of mere politics or
:religion. Once loosed, the human right cannot be contained and yields to
no superior authority. For this reason, when the UDHR was being
drafted, "the British Colonial Office warned its overseas administrators
not to circulate the text of the UDHR, lest this brood of subversive ideas
propagate in the streets before they could be tamed in the UN
Commission." 12 Actual compliance with human rights obligations may
be imperfect, but the branding makes it difficult for any state to deny
utterly that it has at least some duties in those matters.
This natural law mystique emboldens well-meaning actors who
promulgate the legal mandates onto noncompliant groups. Tellingly,
these peoples may have been unrepresented during committee
negotiations that formulated the standards. Unlike the earlier torture
12

ROBERTS, supra note 5, at 137.
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example, they did not commit to the rules only to attempt to avoid them
through legalistic hairsplitting; here they may not concede that the
asserted rights are relevant to them, and may recognize the rule as being
neither right nor consistent with their understanding of what it means to
be "human." As a result, the fear is that:
Instead of serving as a bulwark against fascism and the oppression of
the weak, a declaration of human rights would, eventually, no matter
how well intentioned, tend toward the opposite: it would become a
doctrine "employed to implement economic exploitation and ...
deny the right to control their own affairs to millions of people over
the world, where the expansion of Europe and America has not
[already] meant the literal extermination of whole populations." 13

This divergence between the ennobling sweep of the popular imagination
and the gritty particularities of group life presents the problem this article
attempts to resolve.
Critiquing the slippage between the marketing of human rights
and their applications may appear to some as a false issue. The UDHR is
an aspirational chaiier lacking legal force, serving only as a statement of
principles, much like the role of the Declaration of Independence within
. th.e jJui.spmdence.of.Jhe. . U.nite.d$tate.s...No. one..is.Jikely.to.•b.e.. £.o1111a.ll:Y····
disciplined for failure to abide by the responsibilities with the UDHR. 14
The burden to comply flows instead from the signed treaties which have
at their center the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. 15 Collectively known as the International Bill of Human Rights, 16

13
14

15

16

GOODALE, supra note 11, at 28.
MARK w. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 256 (3d ed. 1999) ("Like other
General Assembly resolutions, however, the Universal Declaration does not in and of itself
constitute a binding international obligation, though it may be cited as an evidence of a
customary international law of human rights, and some feel that by now it is itself part of
customary international law.").
The United Nations lists eighteen instruments as forming the "core" of international human
rights. See The Core International Hu111an Rights Instruments and Their Monitoring Bodies,
U.N.
OFF.
OF
THE
HIGH
COMM'R,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Professionallnterest/Pages/Coreinstruments.aspx (last visited Jan. 20,
2017). The complete list of all human rights instruments is also available. See also Universal
Hu111an
Rights
!nstrn111ents,
U.N.
OFF.
OF
THE
HIGH
COMM'R,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Professionallnterest/Pages/Universa!HumanRightsinstruments.aspx
(last visited Jan. 20, 2017).
UNITED NATIONS, FACT SHEET NO. 2 (REV. 1), THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF HUMAN RIGHTS
(June 1996), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet2Rev. I en.pdf.
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these documents and others operationalize the spirit captured within the
UDHR.
Difficulties come not from the general idea of human rights but
with the attempt to fill the category with enforceable content. This is a
weakness of all natural law systems. Whatever intuitive salience the
notion offers that there is a basic order beyond our ability to either ignore
or change with impunity, identifying universally agreeable tenets has
proven obstinately difficult. The best guidance Thomas Aquinas could
offer was "do good, avoid evil." 17 Lacking any film or consistent criteria
to identify the rules of natural law, a common outcome is for the
speaker's personal preferences to be elevated to universal principle.
Similarly, the heady mixture of natural law justification with positive law
enactments blurs the specific details about the category of human rights.
Disagreement on the identification of human rights arises even
within an international community that shares the same political and
philosophical assumptions. The United States, for example, has declined
to ratify the h'eaties that specify the human rights of women 18 and
children, 19 and was one of only four nations to vote against the 2007 U.N.
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 20 Disputes over legal
...... matters.are.notunc.ommon,.huLin.Jhis. .ius.tanceJhe. la.ck.of cm1sensi1s.. l.iaP
be uniquely damaging to the underlying assumptions. Human rights
enjoy popular endorsement because they are thought to be obvious, even
self-evident consequences of humanness. 21 Consistent rejection of

17

18

19
20

21

THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE I-II q. 94 a. 2 ("[G]ood ought to be done and pursued
and that evil ought to be avoided.").
See U.N. Office of the High Comm'r, Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard, Ratification
of 18 Intemational Human Rights Treaties, http://indicators.ohchr.org/ (last visited Feb. 15,
2017) for the current status of ratification of human rights instruments.
See id. to find the current status of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM'R,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/IPeoples/Pages/Declaration.aspx (last visited Feb. 15, 2017).
The three other states who voted against the Declaration-Australia, New Zealand, and
Canada-like the United States would find it inconvenient if they were compelled to recognize
the rights of its colonized indigenes.
The alleged self-evidency of the human rights raises several difficulties. "This claim of selfevidence, crucial to human rights even now, gives rise to a paradox: if equality of rights is so
self-evident, then why did this assertion have to [be] made and why was it only made in speci fie
times and places?" LYNN HUNT, INVENTING HUMAN RIGHTS: A HISTORY 19 (2007). More to the
point, were the rights truly self-evident, it should not be necessary to expend so many resources
on teaching people to recognize them. However, "[t]he principles enunciated in the UN World
Conference of Human Rights in June 1993 asserted ... the need for human rights education in a
systematic way and on a massive scale." Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism and Transnational
Culture: The Ka Ho'okolokolonui Kanaka Maoli Tribunal, Hawaii, 1993, in HUMAN RIGHTS,
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enabling treaties by the most ardent advocates of human rights
undermines that fa<;ade and threatens to lay bare their ultimately arbitra1y
genesis.
From one perspective, the UDHR and its progeny represent only
the latest step in the formal articulation of rights which runs from the
English Magna Carta (1215) through the French Declaration of the
Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789) and ending with the American
Bill of Rights (1791 ). What set the UDHR apart, however, was its
intention to apply universally to eve1yone on the planet rather than to the
members of a limited political collective. If shared background
assumptions greatly eased those earlier efforts, allowing even
slaveholders to speak unironically about the endowed rights of all men,
the task becomes considerably more challenging when expanded to
include viewpoints that radically differ on the understanding of the good
of human life. When these discussions include perspectives beyond the
modern states, the confusion and disagreement threaten to make the idea
of a human right unsustainable.
Fortunately, the ontological ambivalence that created this
difficulty also offers an opening to discern a methodology identifying
those.pxote.ctionsdesei¥ing . thetitleof~.~huma11rights.:; ..
B. HYPERTROPHY OF INEFFECTIVE HUMAN RIGHTS
Specific human rights are the product of positive law
negotiations subsequently packaged as natural law entitlements. As a
result of that process, requirements of human rights law can diverge from
the norms of folk in two ways. First, the laws themselves may differ
substantively from local norms because they each reflect distinctive
assumptions about human nature. If human rights are intended to emerge
out of what it means to be "human," then to the extent that those
understandings differ, so too must the expectations of the rights that
follow upon those premises. As John Evans recently demonstrated, when
persons in American society hold dissimilar ideas about what it means to
be human, the differences influence attitudes toward human rights. 22 We

12

CULTURE & CONTEXT: ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 28, 30--31 (Richard A. Wilson ed.,
1997).
While Evans' contrasts hehveen philosophical, theological, and biological anthropologies suffice
for present purposes to demonstrate that beliefs about what it means to be "human" yield
different postures toward human rights, more specific conclusions are problematic. Among the
methodological weaknesses of his project is the measure of attitudes toward human rights. He
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can expect to find even more dramatic differences between groups that
share significantly less in common.
Even without the complications from divergent assumptions
about humanness, conflicts can arise when fonnally enumerated human
rights become more extensive. The illusion that human rights gesture
toward universal entitlements might have been sustainable if human
rights had been limited to the 1948 roster in the UDHR, a self-contained
and presumptively unassailable pronouncement akin to the Decalogue.
Unfo1iunately, later pronouncements both more specific and increasingly
numerous have multiplied the opp01iunities for friction between legal
rule and practical living. According to a tally offered by Eric Posner, the
"number of human rights increased from 20 in 1975, to 100 in 1980, to

offers five different scenarios- using US troops to stop genocide, buying a kidney, committing
suicide to avoid incurable disease and expensive medical costs, taking blood from a condemned
prisoner to cure cancer, and torturing terrorists to save lives- and asks respondents to rate the
moral acceptability of each. JOHN H. EVANS, WHAT IS A HUMAN? WHAT THE ANSWERS MEAN
FOR HUMAN RlGHTS 69 (2016).
--- ---- "ffre-·surveyslmws ··thatthe·general· -depictions·assoeiated- with· the- biologiea l- and-philosophical -anthropologies (that we are not special compared to animals, nonunique, of unequal value, with
minds like machines) are associated with less support for specific human rights attitudes. Those
associated with the theological anthropology are associated with more support for human rights
attitudes. In general, those who agree more with the biological and philosophical anthropologies
are less in agreement with human rights, and those who agree more with the theological are more
in agreement with human rights.
However, one can find something morally distasteful while still recognizing an underlying right,
as when the ACLU fought to permit the Nazis to march through the predominantly Jewish
community of Skokie, Illinois. Nat'! Socialist Party of Am. v. Vil!. of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43
(1977). Such difficulties mean that the conclusion that the Darwinian view of humanness tends
toward less tolerance for human rights should be offered with much caution. Even assuming that
Evans has adequately operationalized attitudes toward human rights, the relationship he found
may be an artefact of the specific issue involved, or the general background assumptions of the
discussion. For example, at an earlier time the theological view, in light of the Genesis account
of Noah, argued that black races were inferior and thus slavery and later Jim Crow were the
appropriate responses. See, e.g., STEPHEN R. HAYNES, NOAH'S CURSE: THE BIBLICAL
JUSTIFICATION OF AMERICAN SLAVERY 8 (2002) {"By the 1830s ... the scriptural defense of
slavery had evolved into the 'most elaborate and systematic statement' ofproslavery theory."). It
was the biological/scientific work of others like Franz Boas showing that all races are
indistinguishable that dispelled the myth of the separation of races and made possible the equal
treatment of persons. See FRANZ BOAS, RACE, LANGUAGE, AND CULTURE (1940). See also
Deborah L. Hall, David C. Matz, & Wendy Wood, Why Don't We Practice What We Preach? A
Meta-Analytic Review of Religious Racism, 14 PERS. Soc. PSYCHOL. REV. 126, 134 (2010)
("Although religious people might be expected to express humanitarian acceptance of others,
their humanitarianism is expressed primarily toward in-group members. Thus, we found little
evidence that religiosity motivated racial tolerance.").
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175 in 1990, to 300" in 2014. 23 Although sizeable enough to trigger the
difficulties mentioned, the count does not include the vast catalog of
informal human rights claims speakers casually assert. 24
Growing from a well-received core, more and more rights have
accreted to the category. "Human rights have gone from a general list of
what governments should not do to their citizens in the 1940s to a fullblown moral-theological-political vision of the good life." 25 The
cumulative impact of this expanding roll of actionable human rights has
been to diminish the power of the invocation; the mana of the call to
human rights has been profaned through overuse. But the problem of
immediate interest is that this vision of the good life is characteristically
western, modem, and capitalist, with little to no tolerance for those
societies that do not share these attributes. 26 Yet it is pushed out as
generically "human," barely hiding the implication that societies which
are not western, modern, and capitalist are backward, in some sense not
fully human and therefore vulnerable to corrective interventions.
One can tolerate a measure of imperfection in the
implementation of a plan provided it nonetheless results in clear benefits.
Unfortunately, observers are skeptical that "human rights treaties, on the
.... WhQfo,.hav.e ....impxol\erl . . .the.....well"be.ing.. of.people,.or.even . result(:ld·in
respect for the rights in those treaties." 27 When looking at "whether
countries that have ratified treaties are more likely than they otherwise
would be to conform their actions to the requirements of the treaty,"
Oona Hathaway found that:
[N]ot only is treaty ratification not associated with better human
rights practices than otherwise expected, but it is often associated
with worse practices. Countries that ratify human rights treaties often

23

24

25

26

27

POSNER, supra note 4, at 92.
A conveniently timed example appeared in the program for a recent society meeting, which
promised a defense of "The Human 'Right' to Psychoanalysis." See Annual Meeting Program, L.
&
Soc'y
Ass.
19
(June
2-4,
2016),
http://www.lawandsociety.org/New0rleans20 I 6/docs/20 I 6_Program.pdf. I did not attend this
presentation, so my comments do not go beyond challenging the implications of the title.
Richard Ashby Wilson, 7)11"annosaurus Lex: The Anthropology of Human Rights and
Transnational Law, in THE PRACTICE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: TRACKING LAW BETWEEN THE
GLOBAL AND THE LOCAL 342, 349 (Mark Goodale & Sally Engle Merry eds., 2007).
Jennifer Hendry & Melissa L. Tatum, Human Rights, Indigenous Peoples, and the Pursuit of
Justice, 32 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 351, 356 (2016) ("Individual natural rights became
synonymous with modernity, which was, in turn, irrevocably and undeniably Western."); see
also Merry, supra note 21, at 29 ("Human rights is obviously based on Western liberal-legalist
ideas, [even if] in the postcolonial world, it is no longer exclusively owned by the West.").
POSNER, supra note 4, at 7.
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appear less likely, rather than more likely, to confmm to the
requirements of the treaties than countries that do not ratify these
treaties. 28

The explanation for this gap between fomrnl commitment and improved
securities for citizens is invariably complex. The instances that relate
most directly to the present discussion are those in which the state
authorities fully endorse the international agreements, but have been
unable to convince their citizens to amend their behaviors accordingly.
Sonia HaITis-Shmi examined this situation in the context of the
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. 29 Granting that the "Western
educated elites will inevitably assimilate to some degree the dominate
philosophical ideas and values of the West,"30 the national
representatives nonetheless report that lack of implementation was
"exacerbated by the prevailing perception among the local population
that the general civil and criminal law, as opposed to customary law and
practice, enshrines 'alien ideas' that have been forcibly imposed on them
by more powerful outsiders."31
The reported lack of improving conditions on the ground, in
other words, can be linked to individuals' perceived foreignness of the
.........mandated..standanls. .''.Ju.wbigb.Jbyy . l:rnx~..AYYY.r ag!~yS:Qan£ljnthe, . sr~at!2!1. .
of which they have played no part."32 The present discussion responds to
HaITis-Shmi's observation that societies resist compliance with rules that
do not reflect or even contradict their fundamental values.

28

29

30

31
32

Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1989
(2002). The finding that treaty ratification is nnlikely to lead to positive outcomes is especially
true for autocratic regimes, presumably the environments where the human rights protections are
most needed. Eric Neumayer, Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for
Human Rights?, 49 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 925 (2005). See also BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS 12 (2009) (offering a slightly
more optimistic conclusion) ("[R]egardless of their acknowledged role in generally separating
the committed human rights defenders from the worst offenders, treaties also play a crucial
restraining role."). But according to Samuel Moyn, the hope Simmons offers is "a pessimistic
reformist hope." Samuel Moyn, Do Human Rights Make Enough of a Difference?, in THE
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 329, 330 (Conor Gearty & Costas Douzinas
eds., 2012).
Sonia Harris-Short, International Human Rights Lmv: Imperialist, Inept and Ineffective?
Cultural Relativism and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 130

(2003).
Id. at 170.
Id. at 143.
Id. at 180.
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C. ETHNOGRAPHIC ILLUSTRATIONS
Given that a problem may exist in theory between the push for a
uniform relationship between the state, its citizens, and the cultural
values that give existential meaning to those citizens, a remedy is needed
only if we have reason to believe that this tension actively manifests in
real world interactions. Unfortunately, instances of such conflicts are not
difficult to find.
In Nepal, for example, Buddhists seeking to protest the effort by
the state to establish Hinduism as the national religion marched under a
banner that "Secularism is a human right." 33 Although this may appear to
be precisely the situation that the UDHR was intended to address, the
action, however needful in order to promote their cause, came at a high
cost.
In order to defend themselves as Buddhists against the Hindu state,
Buddhists have been compelled to call on human rights and to
represent themselves according to the ontologies of identity that
inhere in liberal law. However, it is precisely by disavowing key
aspects of this liberal way of understanding the person that Buddhism
distinguishes itself and constitutes its adherents as Buddhist. There is,

n1e1:;;r0re;·ail Irrecoilc1Ia£Ie tension lle!Ween wliaf ·13uaa11r;;r;;·a0 aila········
the subjectivities they inhabit when they call on human rights, and the
acts and identities whose rights are supposed to guarantee. 34

To preserve themselves as a distinct group, these Buddhists must adopt a
worldview that erases the distinctiveness they hope to preserve. The
tension represents a not uncommon instance when "people have been
forced to claim rights that in fact represent losses to them." 35
As the Nepali Buddhists illustrate, one of the harmful
consequences of the human rights program is that it banishes other
means of expressive resistance. 36 There now exists only one language in
33

34
35

36

Lauren Leve, "Secularis111 Is a Human Right!": Double-Binds of Buddhis111, De111ocracy, and
Idelllity in Nepal, in THE PRACTICE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: TRACKING LAW BETWEEN THE GLOBAL
AND THE LOCAL 78 (Mark Goodale & Sally Engle Merry eds., 2007). See also David N. Gellner,
From Group Rights to Individual Rights and Back: Nepalese Stmggle over Culture and Equality,
in CULTURE AND RIGHTS: ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 177, 186 (Jane K. Cowan, MarieBenedicte Dembour & Richard A. Wilson eds., 2001) (further describing the debate in Nepal).
Leve, supra note 33, at 79.
Jane K. Cowan, Marie-Benedicte Dembour, Part II: Claiming Cultural Rights, in CULTURE AND
RIGHTS: ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 149, 151 (Jane K. Cowan, Marie-Benedicte
Dembonr & Richard A. Wilson eds., 2001 ).
Annelise Riles, Anthropology, Human Rights, and Legal Knowledge: Culture in the Iron Cage,
108 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 52, 56 (2006) ("[H]uman rights disconrse has now achieved a kind
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which to voice a protest, one that is freighted with culturally specific
presumptions about agency and self. The choice becomes to preserve the
local values but lose the ability to effectively resist the injury, or to adopt
the mandated forms at the cost ofunde1mining the very values wished to
be preserved.
The harm here may be mitigated because, according to Leve, the
Buddhists are not themselves consciously "disturbed by the personal and
cultural translations that the discursive practice of human rights entails"
because here, as elsewhere, "people apply different logics and standards
in different domains of life." 37 But as a general rule in such matters, the
viewpoint of the subject is not wholly determinative in deciding whether
an injury exists. Were that the case, many human rights endeavors, such
as the struggle to eliminate female genital cutting, would fail for lack of
suppmi among the women such projects are intended to benefit. 38
In a second ethnographic example, Heather Montgomery points
out that many international standards, including the UN Convention on
the Rights of the Child, presuppose an ideal of childhood that "is based
on a Western model which may not be appropriate for all societies. It
implies that every child [defined as anyone under the age of eighteen]
.... has... a ..rightJo 1:t.childhoodthatis ..fi:S<.e. :f:m.m.Jhe. JesPQlll'!ib.Uitie§. . Qf ..w.Qrk.,
money and sex: in other words, a Western-style childhood."39 Although
this ideal of childhood as an age of innocence did not become dominant
in the West until the Victorian era, 40 it is now the requirement worldwide.

37
38

39

40

of hegemonic status: It is 'the sole approved discourse of resistance'. Hence it is important to pay
attention both to what cannot be said in the language of human rights and to the way human
rights discourses disempower other discourses of resistance.").
Leve, supra note 33, at 106.
See, e.g., Bettina Shell-Duncan & Ylva Hemlund, Female "Circumcision" in Afi·ica:
Dimensions of the Practice and Debates, in FEMALE "CIRCUMCISION" IN AFRICA: CULTURE,
CONTROVERSY, AND CHANGE I, 24-25 (Bettina Shell-Duncan & Ylva Hernlund eds., 2000)
("The way that outraged 'Western' women championed the issue has since been accused of
revealing 'latent racism,' 'intellectual neo-colonialism,' and 'anti-Arab and anti-Islamic fervor',
and efforts to 'eradicate FGM' have been seen as an imperialistic intervention from meddling
Westerners of privilege."). Thus we find justifications like the following: "it is not objectionably
arrogant to protect interests that the intended beneficiaries have reason to regard as urgent, even
if they do not actually do so." CHARLES R. BEITZ, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RlGHTS 204 (2009).
Heather Montgomery, Imposing Rights? A Case Study of Child Prostitution in Thailand, in
CULTURE AND RIGHTS: ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 80, 83 (Jane K. Cowan et al. eds.,
2001).
HUGH CUNNINGHAM, CHILDREN AND CHILDHOOD IN WESTERN SOCIETY SINCE 1500 72 (2005)
("the truly revolutionary impact of Romanticism on thinking about childhood [is a shift] from
being the smallest and least considered of human beings, the child had become endowed with
qualities which made it godlike, fit to be worshipped, and the embodiment of hope."). See also
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Montgomery illustrates the tension by documenting a rule which seems
to promote an uncontroversial common good, that children should be
free from sexual exploitation. In Thailand, however, enforcing that right
can infringe on other rights:
Child prostitution is not necessarily the self-evident evil it appears to
be for outsiders; in Baan Nua, ensuring a child's right to be free from
sexual exploitation would mean violating their rights to live with
their families and in their communities .... Assuring one right only
becomes possible at the expense of other rights - in this case to food,
shelter and family unity, that is, precisely those rights which these
families prioritize over the child's right to be free of sexual
intervention. 41

From among equally valued rights, the subject's priorities
arguably should prevail, not those of outsiders. This concession is
especially prudent given the argument that any effort to prioritize human
rights is impossible without recourse to pragmatics and political
judgment. 42 Imposed priorities are not the logical consequences of the
rights but only the habitual preferences of external critics.
These children tend not to see themselves as exploited, raising
.th~. qµ~s1i9n. Fh§JQC;;'.IJhe

41

42

xights tn111splanted fr.9.m . .mJtside... shQuld. take.

PHILIPPE ARIES, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF FAMILY LIFE 47 (1962)
("No doubt the discovery of childhood began in the thirteenth century, and its progress can be
traced in the history of art in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. But the evidence of its
development became more plentiful and significant from the end of the sixteenth century and
throughout the seventeenth."). The social constmction of childhood was one of the first
conclusions from anthropology to receive popular attention. MARGARET MEAD, COMING OF AGE
IN SAMOA 196 ( 1972) ("Can we think of adolescence as a time in the life history of every girl
child which carries with it symptoms of conflict and stress as surely as it implies a change in the
girl's body? ... [W]e had to answer [this question] in the negative.").
Montgomery, supra note 39, at 94-95.
Gunnar Beck, The Mythology of Human Rights, 21 RATIO Jurus 312, 314 (2008). Pessimism
about ranking human rights is justified because the values being compared are
"incommensurable [meaning] it cannot be said of one that it is either better or worse than the
other nor, importantly, that it is of equal value to another so that 'reason has no judgment to
make concerning their relative values'." Id. at 317 (quoting Joseph Raz). See also James Griffin,
The Relativity and Etlmocentricity of Human Rights, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 555, 557 (Rowan Cruft et al. eds., 2015). If this is the case, then the human
rights cannot be rationally argued to be superior to any competing moral code, such as those
encountered in other societies. In face of this stubborn incomparability, our assumption of "the
rationality and self-evidence of our values is itself, it would seem, a socially bred illusiondogmatism parading under a veneer of reason." SOLOMON ASCH, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 367-368

(1952).
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precedence over the "children's voices or disregard their worldview." 43
Montgome1y cautions that:
[R]ights, especially the right to be free from sexual exploitation, do
not need to be imposed on children without their consent. Rather,
they can be built upon the rights that children claim are important to
them. It is not that the child prostitutes do not want the right to be
free of sexual exploitation, as promised in the UN Convention. It is,
rather, that by taking that right out of context, and by disregarding the
cultural prioritization of rights, its implementation is actually inimical
to these paiiicular children's well-being. 44

A third observation is offered by James Zion, who criticizes the
imposition of human rights law upon North American indigenes:
The premises of modern human rights law are that the individual
must be protected against the state in equality with all other
individuals. While equality before the law and equality in access to
the fundamentals of daily life are essential principles, they are not
acceptable for Indians in their external relations with the outside
world. Unbending equality is essentially assimilationist; and
assimilation is ethnocidal and genocidal in its impact upon Indians,
both as individuals and as groups. 45

·········u1iilf .info tlie 'ccfre pi'eceprn·· oiiniefifal!Onal numahtl:glitstawis · · ·
the assumption that the proper focus is the isolated individual. Although
the view of the individual as the appropriate unit for liberal analysis is
characteristic of Western political philosophy, alternative views take

43

44

Montgomery, supra note 39, at 95.
Id. at 97. Bell offers a similar description of how an outsider's perspective may result in a
different conclusion concerning the proper priorities that should be given to a suite of interests:
What is the standard of universality against which women's rights are to be tested? At
first glance, Aboriginal customary marriages are in conflict with human rights
provisions, for they involve "promised marriage" and "infant bestowal." The cultural
context within which such marriages were contracted, however, binds kin in a web of
reciprocal obligations, rights, and responsibilities that have implications for land
ownership and ceremonial duties: in short, they were part and parcel of the survival of
the culture. By focusing on the individual rights of one woman, the nature of the
system of Aboriginal marriage arrangements is obscured.

45

Diane Bell, Considering Gender: Are Human Rights for Women, Too? An Australian Case, in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS 339, 349
(Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im ed., 1992).
James W. Zion, North American Indian Perspectives on Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS 191, 193 (Abdullahi Ahmed AnNa'im ed., 1992).
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aggregates like the family as the center of moral claims. 46 Another
approach finds that the right exists in the relationships between people,
and not in the people themselves. 47 The point is that:
[C]oncepts of personhood va1y dramatically cross-culturally. In India
and Melanesia, for example, a dominant view on the individual
emphasizes that he or she is a product of social relations and far from
that self-sustaining, independent and inviolable 'monad' the Western
individual is seen as. In such societies, the community rather than the
individual is accorded rights, and the individual has duties rather than
rights. In such societies, individual human rights can be seen as truly
alien, even if they are often promoted and adopted by some segments
48
of society, usually educated middle-class elites.

Zion finds that "[t]he focus on the individual ignores the great
importance of the group-of the family (and normally the extended
family), of extended relationships of clan and religion, of the band or
tribe, and even of 'Indian-ness' itself." 49 The larger lesson is that such
contrary accounts show that human rights as they are ordinarily
understood in the international regime do not always evoke recognition
or elicit agreement, nor is it obvious that the alternative arrangements are
inferior. The harshest criticism for many alternatives is that they are not

·· · tne·serr:serectea vaTues··5rwesfe1:ners~ Tiiaf iJeCffgree; lloweve1:; 8Eoili<lnot be the basis for compelling changes in others. "Our Kantian ethics

46

47

48

49

Rhoda E. Howard, Dignity, Community, and Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSSCULTURAL PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS 81, 84 (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im ed.,
1992) ("[I]n most known past or present societies, human dignity is not private, individual, or
autonomous. It is public, collective, and prescribed by social norms. The idea that an individual
can enhance his or her 'dignity' by asserting his or her human rights violates many
societies'most fundamental beliefs about the way social life should be ordered.").
ROBERTS, supra note 5, at 43--44 ("The relational strand of thought concerning human rights
never took hold. But nor did it die out False Within the single word, "right," regardless of how it
is used - legally, politically, philosophically - it always references a complex set of
relationsFalse In this sense, a right ... is not a thing unto,itself. Nor can individuals or groups
somehow possess a right as the commonly used phrase "bundle of rights" would imply. A Right
simply defines an "individual's position in a fluid network of social relations" and institutional
configurations. So the meaningful unit of analysis cannot be the individual, the right, or the
group - it is the nature of the interaction( s) that simultaneously defines all three.")
Thomas Hylland Eriksen, Multiculturalism, Individualism and Human Rights: Ro111anticis111, the
En/ighte11111ent and lessons fi'om Afauritius, in HUMAN RIGHTS, CULTURE & CONTEXT:
ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 49, 64-65 (Richard A. Wilson ed., 1997).
Zion, supra note 45, at 195.
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invites us to assume that everyone wishes to be treated like we would
like. This is rubbish." 50
Disagreements can arise over metaphysical beliefs as in the
Nepalese example, the differing prioritization among rights found among
Thai child prostitutes, or whether the identified bearer of the itemized
right should be an atomized individual or, as among Native Americans,
the community. Moreover, it should not escape notice that in all three
instances the criticized societies are at a structural disadvantage in their
encounters with outsiders seeking to dictate the proper anangement of
internal social relationships. They are thus ill-positioned to flagrantly
disregard the demand to comply. Given such power imbalances, altered
behaviors may be more accurately understood as submission rather than
the result of reform or modernization.
If human rights are to live up to their promise we must assume
that, as humans, all peoples should be able to relate in some positive way
to any claim asserted under this label. The details may differ, but it
would be odd if something that is held out as a fundamental requirement
for the development of human potential would be alien, even
incomprehensible to a nontrivial portion of the world's population. Even
.... iU.Jl . J:t9xi\;tJY.th~L Q.\;m!~sl t.hQ§~J!gQ.!§ ~gg X~.Pi:~.s§~s!Jg()~9 he,.~clg£1~~.

!he

citizens should agree that the proffered human right would be a general
good, all things considered. To adopt a contrary opinion colors
noncompliant societies as outliers, either as not being fully human, or
ignorant of the way to properly manage their own humanity.
II.

FRAMING THE PROBLEM

Moving from the description of the problem to the more f01mal
analyses, we find that the difficulty, and its solution, is overdetermined.
Independent approaches from jurisprudence and legal anthropology show
that if the disagreement is to be rectified, there must be a transparent
treatment of what it means to be "human." If that can be achieved, the
identification of human rights should preserve those p01iions of the
cmTent regime that can be validated cross-culturally.
From the perspective of impacted societies, the introduction of
human rights obligations raises issues of legal transplants. A term
introduced by Alan Watson, "legal transplant" refers to "the moving of a
50

Dianne Otto, Rethinking the "Universality" of Human Rights Law, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV.!, 2 (1997) (quoting Martti Koskenniemi).

Vol. 34, No. 3

From Legal Transplants to Fair Translation

495

rule or a system of law from one country to another, or from one people
to another." 51 As shown by Watson, that fact does not make the
introduced rule illegitimate. Special problems, however, arise that
influence how and under what conditions a rule will be received.
To help understand these problems, the next section considers a
recent exchange between two legal philosophers, Joseph Raz and Jeremy
Waldron. Raz represents a group of thinkers who believe that we should
take human rights as a pragmatic given and cease looking for anything
deeper that links or justifies them. 52 The purportedly false premise that
"human rights" encodes fundamental assumptions of humanness and
personhood has led to an unprofitable debate and distracts from what is
truly important, such as policing states to safeguard the rights of their
citizens.
Waldron disagrees, arguing instead that Raz's approach fails to
adequately capture why we find the idea of the human right so
compelling. While admitting that the search for philosophical
foundations for the category can be elusive and frustrating, Waldron
believes that anything less misses the point. 53
The problem described by Waldron can be reduced to the
.struggl@.to definethe-0ateg0i:ye.£r~ghts·ef:humans.·Whatcleesthatword··· ·
refer to? The final section reviews concerns that have been expressed by
anthropologists about the gap between the label and the actual contents
of the legal regime.

A. JURISPRUDENTIAL BACKGROUND
The contrast between the rhetoric of a universal human right
localized and the practicalities of local ideals universalized can be
51
52

53

ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 21 (2d ed. 1994).
A thorough defense of this approach is offered by Charles Beitz: "A practical conception [of
human rights] takes the doctrine and practice of human rights as we find them in international
political life as the source materials for constrncting a conception of human rights. It understands
questions about the nature and content of human rights to refer to objects of the sort called
"human rights" in international practice. There is no assumption of a prior or independent layer
of fundamental rights whose nature and content can be discovered independently of a
consideration of the place of human rights in the international realm and its normative discourse
and then used to interpret and criticize international doctrine. Similarly, it is not assumed that
human rights seek to describe what is actually common to all political-moral codes or to state
common standards reachable to inference from them. Instead, we take the functional role of
human rights in international discourse and practice as basic: it constrains our conception of a
human right from the start." BEITZ, supra note 38, at 102--03.
See i11fi·a notes 72-80 and accompanying text.
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illustrated through a recent exchange between legal philosophers Raz and
Waldron. Their disagreement underscores the ongoing debate over the
intrinsic nature of the human right, whether it has an essence at all, and if
so, of what kind.
The relevance of the problem to identify what the human rights
have in common is of the highest order. Appeals to human rights ideals
characterize the theme of the post-World War II political order.
Emerging from the chaos and confusion of the destructive excesses of an
international system grounded in state sovereignty, human rights arose as
a preventive counterbalance. This history renders it possible that human
rights are an ad hoc collection of remedies rather than the actualization of
a natural kind.
Raz criticizes what he terms the "traditional" approach to human
rights, which has two distinctive elements: it "aims 'to derive' human
rights from basic features of human beings which are both valuable and
in some way essential to all which is valuable in human life ... [and]
Second, [that] human rights are basic, perhaps the most basic and most
important, moral rights." 54 He finds three weaknesses in all attempts to
develop this line of thinking that helps to create the mythology of the
...........human•.1ight . . as•. supranationaLYalue.s.:;.. Eits.t,... '..'.[tJhey. .Jnisconcei¥eJh1;1.
relations between values and rights." 56 In other words, not all goods are
necessarily rights. Other means exist to achieve normative goals than the
reduction of all conflicts and disagreements to fit the model of
adversarial legal enforcement of entitlements. Second, foundational
efforts "overreach, trying to derive rights which they cannot derive. And
they fail either to illuminate or to criticize the existing human rights
practice. " 57
Rather than reasoning forward from first principles such as
personhood, dignity, well-being, or actualization, Raz prefers to argue
backwards from the fact that human rights institutions and instruments
exist, making the primaiy question how to best refine and demarcate the
limits of that practice. 58 Human rights do not need to be justified; they

54

55
56

57
58

Joseph Raz, Human Rights without Foundations, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
321, 323 (Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas eds., 20 I 0).
Raz's discussion highlights in this regard the efforts of Alan Gewirth and James Griffin.
Raz, supra note 54, at 323.
Id. at 324-24.
Id. at 327.
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need to be improved. Following Rawls's discussion, 59 Raz defines human
rights as "rights which set limits to the sovereignty of states, in that their
actual or anticipated violation is a (defeasible) reason for taking action
against the violator in the international arena." 60 This approach appears to
internationalize the legal realism invoked by Oliver Wendall Holmes's
"bad man" rule to identify law as the rules courts are willing to enforce,
and not by the statements in statute books. 61 By analogy, human rights
are the rules whose breach will justify military intervention against a
sovereign state, and only those.
In this view, no human right to education exists (as proclaimed
by UDHR Article 26) because it is not likely to be a cause "whose
violation might justify international action against a state." As examples
of true human rights, Raz offers the list constructed by Rawls:
The right to life (to the means of subsistence and security); to liberty
(to freedom from slavery, serfdom, and forced occupation, and to a
sufficient measure of liberty of conscience to ensure freedom of
religion and thought); to property (personal property); and to formal
equality as expressed by the mies of natural justice (that is, that
similar cases be treated similarly). 62
··Whateverthe·rightsare·decided/tcr·be;Raz~s

point··istlrat''tlremcrrai
principles determining the limits of sovereignty must reflect not only the
limits of the authority of state [i.e., what it is thought the state should or
should not be able to do], but also the relatively fixed limitations on the
possibility of justified interference by international organisations and by
other states in the affairs of even an offending state. " 63 Human rights
occur at the intersection of the abstract political philosophies on the
proper role of governments and the legitimate extent of their powers,
with the practical realities of the acceptable justifications one state can
offer-to other states and to its own citizens-to invade a sovereign
entity that is not directly threatening it.
Raz's thesis forces him into potentially awkward conundrums.
He concludes, for example, that because Rawls has, like other
traditionalists, similarly failed to differentiate between rights and values,
59

60

61
62
63

See JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 79 (2001) ("Human rights are a class of rights that play
a special role in a reasonable Law of Peoples: they restrict the justifying reasons for war and its
conduct, and they specify limits to a regime's internal autonomy.").
Raz, supra note 54, at 328.
Oliver Wendall Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
RAWLS, supra note 59, at 65.
Raz, supra note 54, at 331.
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he asse1is as rights matters that are merely wrongs. "Some of [Rawls's]
human rights, for example the human right against genocide, do not
appear to be rights at all. To be sure committing genocide is wrong, but
is it the case that I have a right against the genocide of any people? ...
Not all wrongs constitute violations of rights. Not all the limits of either
state authority or state sovereignty are set by rights." 64
Suggesting that genocide violates no human rights is an odd
result given that human rights specifically emerged as a response to the
acts of genocide by the Nazis. Ordinary citizens may say that if
preventing the physical annihilation of an entire people does not rise to
the level of the human right, then there are no human rights.
In the end, contrary to the traditionalists he sees himself as
arguing against, Raz concludes that:
Individual rights are human rights if they disable a certain argument
against interference by outsiders in the affairs of a state. They
disable, or deny the legitimacy of the response: I, the stale, may have
acted wrongly, but you, the outsiders are not entitled to interfere. I
am protected by my sovereignty. Disabling the defence 'none of your
business', is definitive of the political conception of human rights.
They are rights which are morally valid against states in the

· · · · · ·····rnrei'naflonar ·arena;··arrd t11eff is·110reasoff mtmrrk:··fhm suc11 rtg;lmr ·
must be universal. 65

Raz ends by clarifying his final position:
So that is where human rights come from. They derive from three
layers of argument. First, some individual interest often combined
with showing how social conditions require its satisfaction in certain
ways (e.g. via various forms of instruction) establishing an individual
moral right. ... The second layer shows that under some conditions
states are to be held duty bound to respect or promote the interest (or
the rights) of individuals identified in the first part of the
argument ... The final layer shows that they do not enjoy immunity
from interference regarding these matters. If all parts of the argument
succeed then we have established that a human right exists. 66

64

65
66

Id. at 332. The specification that the claimed right is against the genocide of "any" people is
critical to Raz's argument. If the concern is about genocide of my people, then the right dissolves
to a more ordinary claim to the right not be killed unjustly. In this light, many asserted human
rights may be reducible to a broader power to stand in the place of others who are unable to
effectively exercise their individual rights. To speak of a "right against genocide" (and possibly
other such collective rights), then, reifies what is essentially a process to assert by proxy a more
fundamental right.
Id.
Id. at 336.
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Notably, within this framework "human rights need not be universal or
foundational." 67 In the "first layer" leading to human rights, an
"individual interest" combines with "social conditions" to form an
"individual moral right." 68 These interests and conditions are necessarily
variable. With the generation of divergent moral rights differently
nurtured under sundry legal systems, the emergent norm of the human
right will easily vary over time if not geography. Any general
consistency that arises will be due to contingently shared assumptions
grounding the initial individual interests, rather than necessary
conclusions about the nature of human rights.
There is much to admire in this description. Raz recognizes that
to call something a "human right" lacks any helpful analytic edge. He
emphasizes the categ01y's pragmatic application as the solution, a sword
to puncture sovereignty when a state fails to adequately protect rights
that it can control. If violations would not warrant an all-but literal
"nuclear option," then that interest or value does not qualify as a human
right.
The gap within Raz's account is that while the human rights
have indeed become the "ethical !inga franca" of the modern world, 69
. they.hav:eaGhieved suchstatus.··011the.implied···feundationalaeeount····ef...... .
the traditionalists. In that story, human rights are grounded in the
existential state of being human rather than in the specific relationship
between a citizen and the state. 70 Human rights are what binds us across
state borders, and become the expressive vehicle for empathic responses
to the suffering of others. The account Raz offers favoring the accidental
obligations between governments and citizens may in some sense be
more accurate descriptively, but it generates a radically different
outcome in terms of popular imagination. Raz's approach is a rule for
states, perhaps, but contains little to inspire people and generate the
popular support upon which the human rights regime depends.

67
68
69

70

Id. at 332.
Id. at 336.
John Tasioulas, The Moral Reality of Human Rights, in FREEDOM FROM POVERTY AS A HUMAN
RIGHT: WHO OWES WHAT TO THE VERY POOR 75 (Thomas Pogge ed., 2007).
See, e.g., Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Conclusion, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL
PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS 427, 429-431 (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im ed.,
1992) ("[M]uch of the authority of the concept [of human rights] is derived from its presumed or
alleged universality-that is, the notion that human rights are the entitlements of all human
beings throughout the world with no distinction as to race, gender, religion, and so on.").
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Waldron admits that there can be intellectual difficulties in the
traditional struggle to ground human rights in the state of being
"human": "many will say that the attribution to Cro-Magnon man of the
rights that we take to be human rights today makes no sense." 71 As
anthropology has demonstrated, a wide range of ways to be human
exists. The effo1i to capture underlying consistencies within that diversity
can be daunting.
Waldron begins by identifying two major trends within effmis to
analyze the category of the human right. The first follows the
traditionalist approach that understands the "human" of human rights to
refer to the bearers of the relevant right. 72 The second "refers not to the
right bearers (and their humanity) but to the class of people for whom
violations of these rights are properly a matter of concern .... The idea is
that there is a class of rights such that no human should be indifferent to
the violation of any right in that class." 73 Under this second reading, it is
conceivable that animals can have "human rights" not because they are
human, but because their mistreatment provokes censure from humans.
Labeling the human concern approach the "Armed Intervention View," 74
Waldron further distinguishes whether the position is permissive or
. obligato1¥.. Raw:lsrhe . says, ..re.garded.intervention.as.pe:i.mitted, . . but. Raz.
"couches his view more affirmatively," implying that "in the absence of
reasons to the contrary, non-intervention in response to a violation of one
of these rights would be wrong." 75
Waldron critiques the Armed Intervention View on three
distinguishable grounds. First, intervention is appropriate for multiple
reasons, not just for human rights violations. Regional destabilization,
whether or not rights are involved, is one such justification. Yet "it seems
odd to hold the 'human' in 'human right' hostage to geopolitical factors

71

72
73
74

75

Jeremy Waldron, Human Rights: A Critique of the Raz/Rawls Approach 1 (N.Y. Univ. School of
Law,
Working
Paper
No.
13-32,
2013),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractjd=2272745.
This is the sense adopted in the present paper.
Waldron, supra note 71, at 2.
Id at 4 ("According to the version of the human concei;n approach I have in mind, a right is
properly described as a human right if the appropriate response to its violation by an otherwise
sovereign state is armed inte1ference by an outside state or an international organization aimed at
remedying or punishing or preventing the continuance of the sovereign state's violation.").
Id. at 7. Waldron may be overstating Raz's position here. As noted earlier, Raz states that a
violation is a "defeasible" reason for intervention, not an obligatory one. Raz, supra note 54, at
328.
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in this way." 76 The second criticism is that decisions to intervene will
depend on a plethora of factors beyond the simple identification of a
rights violation. Again, these kinds of calculations seem to cut against
the understanding of what it means for something to be a human right:
As things stand, we identify rights as human rights using general
descriptions-like the right to free speech or the right not to be
tortured. We don't usually refer to them as the right to free-speech-inKosovo or the right not-to-be-tortured-in-Iraq. But if the designation
of a right as human depends on the all-things considered
appropriateness of humanitarian intervention to vindicate that right,
then a given right will tum out to be a human right in some settings
but not in others, depending on how the array of considerations
relevant to the justification of humanitarian intervention plays out in
each setting. The right not to be tortured might prove to be a human
right in Iraq in 2000, but what we usually identify as the same right
might prove not to be a human right in Syria in 2001 because (at the
date of writing: May 2013) the practicalities argue against
humanitarian intervention against the atrocities of the Assad
regime. 77

It is, he concludes "counterintuitive to have the predicate 'human' apply

to rights in this contingent and situational fashion."
.......... ·Tne Tflird:;and .
mosr····troubilng···flaw ·1u······the.Almed .
Intervention View, is "the way it sells short the individualism of human
rights. " 78 We would not intervene in response to the torture of one
person, although we may if thousands are tortured. That political reality
discredits the injury that has been done to that person since, by definition
under the Armed Intervention View, there has been no human right
violation because there has been no subsequent intervention. This
emphasis away from the individual is at odds with the ordinary discourse
of human rights, which underscores the importance and value of each
person.
By the end of his analysis, Waldron concludes that we should
"reject the proposal to define a right as a human right simply in virtue of
the type of external response that is appropriate when it is violated." 79 He
grants, however, both that the traditionalist focus on the rights-bearer has
significant difficulties, and that "[ s]mne of the ideas picked out by the
human concern view are surely important, and it may well be that we

perliaps···

76

Waldron, supra note 71, at 8.

77

Id. at 10.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 20.

78
79
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should seek eclectically some sort of combination of approaches, with a
set of rights being identified as human rights both (a) in terms of their
being rooted in distinctively human interests, on the one hand, and (b) in
terms of their violation being an appropriate subject of global human
concern. " 80
The task, in other words, is to reconcile contradictory intuitions
and historical realities. The latter recognizes that the human rights have
been created to solve specific problems of political organization based on
the presumptive inviolability of state sovereignty. The former, though,
insists that human rights exist prior to the state, and demand recognition
and reaction. The challenging nature of human rights is that both these
mutually exclusive claims are true.
Waldron suggests that a middle course be found that respects
both the pragmatics of taking human rights in some sense as a given as
well as the intuitions that the value of human rights flows from their
roots in our shared status as human beings. Part III will attempt to offer
such a compromise by grounding human rights in the shared norms of
the world's societies rather than abstracted out of philosophical
principles or selected from the values of only a few powerful groups.

B. ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE VALUE OF DIVERSITY
As admitted by one author, "[t]hat a universal law of human
rights has the potential to erase cultural diversity is hardly disputable. " 81
When discussing a draft of this paper, a colleague suggested that this
possible outcome was not a true quandary because cultural diversity
should be eliminated, thus clearing the path to universal and uniform
rights for all. Few may state this conviction so bluntly, but in practice it
may well be the prevailing posture. 82 The reasoning appears to be that

80

81
82

Id. at 21. But cf. Joseph Raz, On Waldron's Critique of Raz on Human Rights, (Columbia Law
School, Working Paper No. 13-359, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2307471 (claiming that
Waldron has misunderstood his position).
Otto, supra note 50, at 7.
"[V]irtually every government of a sovereign state, north or south, has adopted a modernization
outlook that regards premodern culture as a form of backwardness to be overcome for the sake of
the indigenous. Proceeding on that basis, the preferred normative response to the existence of
indigenous peoples is not deference to their cultural autonomy, but rather their orderly and
equitable assimilation into the more benevolent and promising cultural space of the modernizing
ethos." Richard Falk, Cultural Foundations for the Intemational Protection of Human Rights, in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS 44, 47

(Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im ed., 1992).
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some fortunate societies have hit upon a clearly superior way of life and
all other versions should converge toward that solution. Whatever
disagreement exists on fundamental values will be resolved when
dissidents are either assimilated or allowed to slide into extinction.
A different point of view-one typical of anthropologists-holds
that human societies display a range of norms and organizational
systems, and that this diversity is a good that should be valued. 83 Cultural
variability is not slightly different shades of the same hue; practices can
be markedly divergent so that something commonplace in one can be
strangely alien in another. As Posner points out, "foreign countries really
are foreign. It is hard for us to understand their peoples, customs,
institutions, and pathologies."84 The fact of difference complicates even
talking about universal goals, much less attaining them. "For example,
during translation of the 1988 Annual Report of the Yukon Human
Rights Commission, it was discovered that the term 'equal,' in its human
rights context, did not have an equivalent in any of the six Aboriginal
languages used in the publication." 85
Anthropologists grew concerned that a regime of human rights
may not be sufficiently respectful of all peoples, prompting them to
.... ~xpress earlyskepti{>ism .ove1° theprojeet,Wht}n·4he·lJQHR··was·being······
drafted the American Anthropological Association (AAA) voiced its
concerns that parochial values of the victorious West would be projected
outward as the only suitable aspirations for all peoples: 86

83

84
85

86

Cultural diversity has been analogized to the importance of biodiversity. Maffi describes "the
interwoven (and possibly coevolved) diversity in nature and culture to be the 'preeminent fact of
existence,' the basic condition of life on earth. The continued decrease of biocultural
diversity . . . would 'staunch the historical flow of being itself, the evolutionary processes
through which the vitality of all life has come down to us through the ages.'" Luisa Maffi,
Linguistic, Cultural, and Biological Diversity, 29 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 599, 603 (2005)
(citing DAVID HARMON, IN LIGHT OF OUR DIFFERENCES: How DIVERSITY IN NATURE AND
CULTURE MAKES US HUMAN xiii (2002)).
POSNER, supra note 4, at 146.
Allan McChesney, Aboriginal Co111111u11ities, Aboriginal Rights, and the Human Rights System in
Canada, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS 221,
229 (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im ed., 1992).
Am. Anthropological Ass'n, Statement 011 Human Rights, 49 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 539 (1947).
Roberts notes that the AAA was not the only skeptical voice over the human rights project. See
ROBERTS, supra note 5, at 12 ("[P]rominent professional organizations such as the American Bar
Association, the American Anthropological Association, and the American Medical Association,
as well as progressive thinkers such as Hersch Lauterpacht, Hannah Arendt, and Mohandas
Gandhi - each for their own reasons - also rejected key aspects of the new human rights
concept."). Bryan Turner describes how sociology was likewise "skeptical, on historical and
comparative grounds, about the possibility of the social existence of universalistic rights and
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No matter how well-intentioned the [UN Commission on Human
Right's] effort the result of any internationally sanctioned statement
of rights would be the imposition of hegemonic moral values on less
powerful groups of people whose patterns of behavior were
misunderstood and reviled by Western elites. 87

feared
the
document's
normative
assumptions
would
disprop01iionately favor "the personality of the individual" at the
expense of the equally important "cultures of differing human groups."
Given that "the individual realizes his personality tln·ough his culture,"
and that it is not possible to qualitatively evaluate and rank the world's
different cultures, 88 the risk was high that any expression of idealized
values, while seemingly self-evident to those who share similar cultural
backgrounds, would be incomprehensible to others. "What is held to be a
human right in one society may be regarded as anti-social by another
people. " 89
The risk, at least from the perspective of antln·opologists, would
be that parochial values would be elevated to the status of human
universal values and then reverse-engineered to impose them upon
nonconforming societies under the authority ofUDHR Article 28. Article
28 states that "Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in

It

····wil1ch~tl1e"r1gfits and riee<loills seT r0:rn1· rritnrs necra1:afion ca11· oerun.Y

realized." The "social and international order" envisioned is expressly
the modern sovereign state containing economic systems sufficiently
complex to require rights to trade unions (Article 23) and "periodic
holidays with pay" (Article 24), which leaves little room for the simpler
societies historically favored by anthropologists.

87

88

89

obligations." Bryan S. Turner, Outline of a Theol)' of Human Rights, 27 Soc. 489, 489-490
(1993).
Mark Goodale, Toward a Critical Anthropology of Human Rights, 47 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY
485, 486 (2006).
The belief that some cultures are intrinsically inferior to others has become a revived opinion.
See, e.g., Shalailah Medhora, Tony Abbott Says Political Future Not "Entirely Resolved", But
Hints He Will Stay in Parliament, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 8, 2015, 5:00 AM),
https: //www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2015/dec/08/tony-ab bott-po1itical-future-notresolved-but-hints-he-will-stay-in-parliament ("All cultures are not equal, and frankly, culture
that believes in decency and tolerance is much to be preferred than one that thinks that you can
kill in the name of God, and you've got to be prepared to say that."); David Brooks, All Cultures
Are
Not
Equal,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
11,
2005),
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?reF990CE2DA l 43EF932A257 5BCOA9639C8B63.
Am. Anthropological Ass'n, supra note 86, at 542.
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As a profession, anthropology did not reengage in the debates
over human rights until the late eighties. 90 This lack of pmiicipation
unfortunately allowed many of the background practices and
assumptions concerning the identification, application and enforcement
of human rights to become normalized into uncontroversial premises
without input from the academic specialty most familiar with the range
of human organizations. When the field again turned its attention to the
topic of international human rights, the renewed attention did not flow
from a reduced skepticism concerning the potential for traditional
societies to be disadvantaged by global institutions. Instead, it reflected a
begrudged realization that the power exerted by these institutions had
become too pervasive globally to ignore. Human rights ideology and its
accompanying accoutrements had become a part of the cultural
landscape that anthropologists endeavor to study.
A recent histmy of the drafting of the UDHR imparts that the
underlying values of the Declaration were not quite as nanowly
parochial as the AAA had feared. 91 We have good reason to believe that
drafters of the UDHR thought themselves to be speaking in the more
inclusive sense of human. While not venturing beyond the scope of
...modem... ..states, .the ...preliminary .documet1ts ..at least. . ..i;;up;~yed .. a broad
spectrum of those members. 92
Even if the most significant gaps would eventually be conected
with the UN's later Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 93
the philosophical problem raised by the AAA remains. The label of
"human right" is a powerful talisman, and one that should be used
carefully and in full awareness of its unspoken premises. What makes
something a human as opposed to a local civil right? The debate can be
critical because while civil rights can remain a legitimate focus of
90

91

92

93

GOODALE, SURRENDERING TO UTOPIA, supra note 11, at 25, 31 ("[H]uman rights vanish from
the anthropological radar for almost forty years .... American anthropology, not to mention the
wider discipline, played almost no role in the formal development of human rights theory or
institutional practice in the important first decades of the postwar periodFalse [I]t wouldn't be
until the 1980s that anthropology as a discipline took a sustained interest in human rights for the
first time."). According to his review, "[a]fter 1949, the phrase 'human rights' did not appear in
the title of any atticle published in the AAA's flagship peer-reviewed journal until 1987."
Goodale, Toward a Critical Anthropology, supra note 87, at 487.
See MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (200 I).
Id. at 73 (reflecting responses to "about seventy questionnaires asking for reflections on human
rights from Chinese, Islamic, Hindu, and customaty law perspectives, as well as from American,
European, and socialist points of view.").
G.A. Res. 61/295, Declaration on the Rights oflndigenous Peoples (Sept. 13, 2007).
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spirited discussion, once something has been named a "human right," in
practice all reasonable dissent ceases.
If the reasons behind the proposal of specific human rights were
to become more transparent we might then reliably sort which should (or
should not) be contained within the category. This, incidentally, was
precisely the tactic that the UN Committee had eschewed: Believing a
consensus on human rights could be found if eve1yone was allowed to
use their own viewpoints, the drafting committee omitted any mention of
the philosophical sources for the named rights. 94 This reticence contrasts
with the U.S. Declaration of Independence, for example, which was able
to justify its claims "that all men are created equal" and that they possess
"ce1iain inalienable Rights" by the dual assertions that these conclusions
were at once "self-evident" and thus needed no further justification, but
also that, if such were needed, these rights were gifts from "their
Creator." But while avoiding any fundamental justifications may have
been a pragmatically successful strategy to achieve consensus on the
UDHR among culturally and philosophically diverse groups, the
document remains nonetheless committed to the position that human
rights were recognized rather than conferred by the member states. In
............the01y"..w.the.....1JDHR. articulate.Ii. xights . . imiiYi~lulils Jlh:()agy .PQ§§~§s,.misL
which states are tasked to respect and, when necessary, defend. Even
when intending to be agnostic on the ontology of human rights, assuming
that they are fundamentally inherent to all peoples seems to be
unavoidable if they are to have the desired impact. Despite efforts like
Raz's, the clash between human diversity and human rights callllot be
dissolved by tinkering with our formal definition of human rights.
In that confrontation between law and culture, a significant
change has been the improved understanding of culture. When
antln-opologists returned to the question of human rights they brought
with them a more sophisticated concept. Whereas earlier there had been a
tendency to speak of culture as timeless and unchanging, and thus an
unyielding obstacle to the introduction of new values without inevitably
"breaking" or damaging the society, that blanket premise is no longer
widely held. "The tendency in much of anthropology over the past fifteen

94

"The main difficulty in framing the introductory 'General Principles,' [Rene] Cassin later wrote,
was to 'find a formula that did not require the Commission to take sides on the nature of man and
society, or to become immured in metaphysical controversies, notably the conflict among
spiritual, rationalist, and materialist doctrines on the origin of human rights."' GLENDON, A
WORLD MADE NEW, supra note 91, at 68.
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years [has been] to complicate or even abandon the notion of culture."95
Rather than a stagnant receptacle to preserve the past, culture's function
is to solve problems in the present, which requires that it be capable of
dynamically adapting to a changing environment.
Cultures consist of repertoires of ideas and practices that are not
homogeneous but continually changing because of contradictions
among them or because new ideas and institutions are adopted by
members. They typically incorporate contested values and practices.
Cultures are not contained within stable borders but are open to new
ideas and permeable to influences from other cultural systems,
although not all borders are equally porous. Cultural discourses
legitimate or challenge authority and justify relations of power. 96

Former pessimism among anthropologists about the influence of human
rights rules on traditional societies has faded. Now, the realization is that
a culture can absorb and interpret almost any new infonnation, especially
if that information is properly introduced over adequate time. This
openness results in change, but in a manner that allows the understanding
of itself as a distinctive group to remain coherent. This revised culture
concept means that groups are more active in their responses to the

.i~.!r().~l1,~ti()1:1...()L~~~.~.1:1~ S()1!1:~ti,1J2e,s ~()1:11E.~.4i~.!()1:¥ . ".a!~.e,.~.: . :t::r5~J~.1:JJ~.e,i: mere
carriers of an unchanging past, societies can each devise their own ways
f01ward.
Nevertheless, there is a limit to the expected cultural flexibility
while still remaining hue to the culture's self-understanding. Cultural
teachings concerning what is right, good, and n01mal fonn the building
blocks of identity and default worldview, and thus cannot be easily or
quickly rewritten. The norms of culture deeply permeate the definitions
of self and are the standards by which we each find meaning and purpose
in life. The powerful influence of these formative assumptions become
evident when migrating into a new context with different conclusions on
those questions. 97 Dissonance can result in well-intentioned people
inadvertently violating the nonnative expectations of the new society.

95

96

97

Karen Engle, Fro111 Skepticis111 to Embrace: H11111an Rights and the American Anthropological
Association from 1947 to 1999, in ENGAGING CULTURAL DIFFERENCES: THE MULTICULTURAL
CHALLENGE IN LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES 344, 345 (Richard Shweder et al. eds., 2002).
SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE: TRANSLATING
INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOCALJUSTICE 11 (2006).
See, e.g., RALPH LINTON, THE TREE OF CULTURE 39 (1961) ("Even the most deliberately
unconventional person is unable to escape his culture to any significant degree.").
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Change is possible, but should be expected to be neither easy nor
painless.
Other instances of clashes between cultural diversity with new
nonns of social regulation prove instructive to illustrate this difficulty.
Within the American criminal legal system, this dissonance has been
framed as a question concerning the legitimacy and permissibility of the
"culture defense." 98 To the extent courts are concerned with fair and
equitable outcomes, judges have sometimes allowed evidence of foreign
cultural nonns to serve as mitigating circumstances dming sentencing,
or, more rarely, as defenses to the charge itself. 99 These allowances are
feasible only after understanding that others can act in ways that are
reasonable from their view. Just as we act in ways that are reasonable in
ours, so too may others lack the required "guilty mind" often required for
punishment. 100
Once it has been thought inequitable to demand that all persons
in every circumstance comply with a uniform set of criminal rules, the
door opens to recognize that societies can view the broader norms of
behavior differently. Any claim enforcing a universal standard of
conduct, the human rights, should therefore reflect that diversity in either
. . .!h.~. J>1!Q§!eiltix~ nil~§th~.ms!".JYes, gr thfgt,igh tE:~. . PEo,ce.s§.~.§ that craft the
rules.
Recognizing normative diversity compels us to be more explicit
about what are the assumptions generating the global roster of human
rights. Where the supposedly universal human right reflects locally

98

99

100

ALISON DUNDES RENTELN, THE CULTURAL DEFENSE (2004). Although more popularly referred
to as "cultural defenses," the preceding paragraphs demonstrate that all defenses are cultural. To
refer to those asserted by immigrants as "cultural" creates the falsely misleading impression that
only foreigners have "culture," while we rely on something else, perhaps reason and rational
judgment. The term "cultural defense" is thus subtly ethnocentric, and should be avoided. See
also James M. Donovan & John Stuart Garth, Delimiting the Culture Defense, 26 QUINNIPIAC L.
REV. 109 (2007).
A second area of study within this third category concerns legal pluralism: when one unit, such
as a political state, contains within it subsets of additional legal rules. To find this condition it is
usually necessary to have a broad definition of what constitutes "law." But even more strict
narrow definitions find pluralism to have been the normal condition under colonial rule when
one set of laws governed matters of interest to the occupying state, while the indigenous peoples
were allowed to maintain or develop their own solutions for conflicts of little interest to the
foreign adminish·ators, such as family and probate complaints.
The facts of State v. Kargar, 679 A.2d 81 (Me. 1996) offer an easy illustration of this point. An
Afghani immigrant was charged with gross sexual assault after kissing the penis of his ninemonth-old son. A show of respect within his own culture, this same act was criminalized by the
state as a sexual perversion. This was a difference of which Kargar could not reasonably have
been aware, leading to his acquittal.
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favored, but ultimately arbitrary preferences, the dominant powers
should question the appropriateness of imposing it upon societies with
different but equally valid ideas. These hidden assumptions can be
gleaned from the earlier examples: the collision with human rights forced
the Nepalese Buddhists to act as though the individual is the moral
center; the realities experienced by Thai child prostitutes were
shoehorned into a model of development in which children are carefree
and irresponsible for eighteen years; and the First Peoples of North
America were compelled to subordinate their group living in favor of
personal desires. Even when the actions urged by outsiders are beneficial
in a utilitarian calculus, that outcome does not suppmi their
characterization as universally valid normative rules. But it is also
possible that some reasonable candidates for presumptively universal
nonnative rules do exist, if a suitable method can be found to identify
them.
Diversity has its own value. Human rights advocates must leave
a place for difference in their plans. In those situations where diversity
concerns have been fully considered, the modem understanding of
culture presents no obstacle to change. Adaptation is possible, but only
slowly,. .11nd. . only..when.communicatedin.a. manner.thatfi:am~sth€H166a
to adapt in the vernacular of local norms rather than as a demand to adopt
foreign manners.

III. FINDING "HUMAN" HUMAN RIGHTS
Instead of the top-down transplant of human rights, several
writers have suggested human rights should be built bottom-up upon the
values that societies already have. 101 If that can be done, the challenge
shifts from condescendingly schooling the "Other" in what it means to be
human, to encouraging them to live by the standards they themselves
believe they should observe. These norms can be identified empirically,
providing the raw conceptual material to draft human rights standards
that embody priorities recognized by most cultures. This is the "least
common denominator" method most closely associated with the early
work of Alison Dundes Renteln.

101

"A committed vanguard of scholars has arisen to resolve, in a sense, the tension between cultural
diversity and the universalist program of international human rights by identifying those points at
which cultural traditions overlap in a way that reconciles them to both the idea and the
substantive content of international human rights." GOODALE, supra note 11, at 80.
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Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im offers a different solution that
begins by acknowledging that societies often contain a range of opinions
on normative questions. Taking the existing regime of international law
as given, An-Na 'im proposes successive dialogues. 102 The first seeks to
resolve existing normative diversity within a society in the direction of
the formal human rights rnles. 103 Remaining disagreement between
societies would be negotiated by subsequent cross-cultural dialogues. 104
In combination, these techniques promise to yield a defensible
list of human rights that protect relevant interests against state
interference while being translatable into the existing norms of all
groups. The missing piece, however, is an independent standard of
evaluation that can be employed to break any impasse during crosscultural dialogues. Because all societies possess the idea of fairness, Part
IV proposes employing that intuition to complete the description of a
realistic method to identify the human rights.
A. LEAST COMMON DENOMINATOR

Societies are adaptive responses to panhuman problems rooted,
....... aeco:i:<ling-te Turner, in .the.universaLexperience. of. '.'human frailty'.:(.e.,g,,.
shelter, sustenance, reproduction, security). 105 Because many of these
problems are best approached in groups rather than individually (e.g.,
hunting large animals, defense against opposing groups), much of the
work of social living concerns balancing individual desires and
motivations with cooperative goals. 106 Anything claiming to be a human

102
103

uJ.l
105

106

See infi'a Section III.B.
Id.
Id.
Turner, supra note 86, at 504 ("The argument is that we can, in the absence of natural law, avoid
sociological relativism through a re-interpretation of philosophical anthropology to assert an
ontology of rights in the claim that human frailty is a universal feature of human existence.").
See, e.g., Bronislaw Malinowski, The Group and the Individual in Functional Analysis, 44 AM.
J. Soc. 938, 949 (1939) ("Every cultural activity again is carried out through co-operation. This
means that man has to obey mies of conduct: life in common, which is essential to co-operation,
means sacrifices and joint effort, the harnessing of individual contributions and work to a
common end, and the distribution of the results according to traditional claims. Life in close cooperation-that is, propinquity--offers temptations as regards sex and property. Co-operation
implies leadership, authority, and hierarchy, and these, primitive or civilized, introduce the strain
of competitive vanity and rivalries in ambition. The mies of conduct which define duty and
privilege, harness concupiscences and jealousies, and lay down the charter of the family,
municipality, tribe, and of eve1y co-operative group, must therefore not only be known in every
society, but they must be sanctioned-that is, provided with means of effective enforcement.").
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universal should generally relate to those same broad interests rather than
the more specialized problems arising in only a few forms of political
organizations or modern economies (e.g., the right to paid vacations, the
treatment of workers in industrial economies). Instead of defining human
rights through top-down processes that favor the priorities of the
powerful representatives at the table, they should be built up from the
empirically identified experiences from the broadest possible sample of
human societies.
In the literature, this is sometimes called the Least Common
Denominator [LCD] approach, ' 07 and is frequently associated with the
work of Alison Dundes Renteln. 108 Noting that "to date negligible
progress has been made in the direction of establishing that human rights
are universal or even that certain moral principles are widely shared," 109
Renteln devises a method recognizing the bounded diversity of cultures,
one that seeks "homeomorphic equivalents" of proposed rights in each
culture. 110 Reviewing the literature, she finds supp01i to propose the case
of retribution as a candidate universal principle.''' By employing
independent methods-ethnographic descriptions and tenets of major
religious traditions, and case examples of blood money and the feud..RS<n.t~lu.fedsjustifi.e.d . in . concluding ..thaL~.'all.cultures.ha:vt}.mechanisms
which are intended to limit violence and to prevent needless killing." 112
This result does not lead directly to the claim that a right against
excessive punishment is a cross-cultural universal, but it does suppo1i a
practical reliance on a preexisting indigenous ethos capable of providing
"a foundation for human rights." In this instance, Renteln suggests that,
Were we to hold a global referendum on international human rights,
all societies, if they were to vote according to their own ideals, would

107

108

09

See also ALAN GEWIRTH, THE COMMUNITY OF RIGHTS 67 (1996) ("The universality of human
rights ... is a direct consequence of the universality of the needs of agency among all human
being.").
See, e.g., MELVILLE HERSKOVITS, CULTURAL RELATIVISM: PERSPECTIVES IN CULTURAL
PLURALISM 31-32 (1972) ("Absolutes are fixed, and, as far as convention is concerned, are not
admitted to have variation, to differ from culture to culture, from epoch to epoch. Universals, on
the other hand, are those least common denominators to be extracted from the range of variation
that all phenomena of the natural or cultural world manifest.").
ALISON DUNDES RENTELN,
RELATIVISM (1990).

Id. at 95.
Id. at 11.
"' Id. at 95-96.
2
"
Id. at 133.
'

"

0
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unanimously favor certain standards.1 113 l In particular, they would
endorse the principle that "No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
life" (Article 6(1 ), International Covenant of Civil and Political
Rights). (This is not to say that they would subscribe to the other
provisions of this article, e.g., the inherent right to life.) It would
follow that they would also agree with Article 6(3) of the Covenant
and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide, both of which condemn the arbitra1y deprivation of life
that is genocide. Any form of killing which lacks justification, e.g.,
summary executions, would be conh·ary to the universal principle of
retribution. In the absence of the prior wrong, no society tolerates
killing. 114

The general methodological conclusion is that "where it is
possible to demonstrate acceptance of a moral principle or value by all
cultures, it will be feasible to erect human-rights standards. The reality of
universality depends on marshaling cross-cultural data." 115 The benefits
of the method is that through such efforts, human rights can be anchored
"via cross-cultural universals, [making] the standards more likely to be
accepted and taken seriously." 116
Granting that "[a]fter a century of ethnographic work,
anthropologists believe that all societies have human rights
··· ·· pf0p5sittons;'' 117 "tlre·I:;Cf)projectappears~feasible in theory :¥et not
everyone is convinced about the legitimacy of the leap from local norms
to universal human rights. Richard Wilson blithely opines that "Renteln
makes a na'ive conflation of what is common and what is morally

m Others have expressed the opinion that human rights could be identified by popular referendum.
Bertrand G. Ramcharan, The Universality of Human Rights, 58-59 lNT'L COMM. JURISTS REV.,
Dec. 1997, at 105, 106 ("There is an irrefutable democratic test that confirms the concept of the
universality of rights. It is a simple matter. Just ask any human being: Would you like to live or
be killed? Would you like to be tortured or enslaved? Would you like to live freely or in
bondage? Would you like to have a say in how you are governed? If there is any critic of
universality who would argue that an individual would choose execution to life, and bondage or
serfdom to freedom, let him or her come faith. The democratic test of universality is, in our
view, the basis for its strongest affimrntion.") As with most polls, the outcome would be a
function of the wording. The options are rarely as polarized as suggested in this excerpt.
Moreover, most people agreeing that they'd rather be rich than poor does not make wealth a
human right.
114
RENTELN, supra note 108, at 136.
115
Id. at 135.
116
Id. at 138-39.
117
Theodore E. Downing, Human Rights Research: The Challenge for Anthropologist, in HUMAN
RIGHTS AND ANTHROPOLOGY 9, 10 (Theodore E. Downing & Gilbert Kushner eds., 1988).
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justifiable." 118 Presumably, if most world societies believe that
infanticide is acceptable, then that practice satisfies Renteln's criterion to
be deemed a human right. But her case study proposes no such
mechanical cranking through the ethnographic literature blind to the
moral implications of custom. She begins with general statements she
already has reason to believe are "morally justifiable." The only problem
is to see if their geographic dispersion is sufficiently wide to wan-ant
recognition as human universals, and thereby human rights.
A more substantive critique is offered by Rhoda Howard:
To seek an anthropologically based consensus on rights by surveying
all known human cultures ... is to confuse the concepts of rights,
dignity, and justice. One can find affinities, analogues, and
precedents for the actual content of internationally accepted human
rights in many religious and cultural (geographic and national)
traditions, but the actual concept of human rights ... is particular and
modern, and representing a radical rupture from the status-based,
nonegalitarian, and hierarchical societies of the past and present. 119

While all societies may not have independently arrived at the abstract
notion of generic humanness (the names by which many societies call

. . t~:~~:'..!.~~8,: f~i,: ..~~~~Ele,,. . . . . t~~1.1~l~!e, )£ . . . 1,!l;e,~1?: . '.'J:!!e, f e,gpJe,.'.:,12~)) ..Jh!l,! . .
observation does not speak to the primary point. The question is not
whether all groups recognize that eve1y person merits the protections of
human rights; the concern here is that when the demands to comply with
human rights are brought to them, that they see reflected in these rules
the values they already hold. In that way, as Renteln says, "the standards
are more likely to be accepted and taken seriously." While the LCD
method will not prove the cross-cultural salience of the concept of the
human right, it does provide an empirical foundation upon which to
argue that a specific right reflects broad values.
What Renteln's account does not state explicitly, but which the
present argument would support, is the stronger claim that without the
demonstrated acceptance of at least the broadest formulation of the value
118

119
120

Richard A. Wilson, Human Rights, Culture and Context: An Introductio11, in HUMAN RIGHTS:
CULTURE & CONTEXT, ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 7 (Richard A. Wilson ed., 1997). The
criticism misses its mark. Renteln is responding to the argument that human rights are universal,
and reasonably argues that, if that is true, they must indeed be, in some sense, "common." If that
were not true, then human rights are not universal and thus are not "human."
Howard, supra note 46, at 81.
See, e.g., Original Tribal Names of Native North American People, NATIVE LANGUAGES OF THE
AM., http://www.native-languages.org/original.htm (last visited Jan. IO, 2017). For example, the
Navajo called themselves Di11e'e, which in their tongue means "the people." Id.
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at issue, the proposed right fails to qualify as a human right. Such a rnle
should be rebuttably deemed a local civil right that has been exported
and imposed upon alien societies often to the detriment of indigenous
values.
C.

MANAGING CROSS-CULTURAL DISSENSUS

Even if we optimistically find that all societies share norms such
as Renteln's "retribution tied to proportionality," there will inevitably be
disagreement over the triggering details. One group's standard to find the
death penalty "proportional" may be much lower than another's, for
example. Due to such variability, all groups will not reach the same
substantive conclusions about the specifics of identified rights. Or,
granting the right, there may still be strong disagreement over its
appropriate bearers and objects. One society may view retribution to be a
personal right, and others a prerogative of society. Divergence will be
especially likely on propeiiy and family matters because, in addition to
the usual work to organize society, these norms tend to define the
essence of the group itself.
.. .... ... .Resolution.of.disagre.ements,. .acc.ording to.AhdullahiAhm.edAnN a' im, should follow a process of exchanges which (like Raz) "accepts
the existing international standards while seeking to enhance their
cultural legitimacy within the major traditions of the world through
internal dialogue and strnggle to establish enlightened perceptions and
interpretations of cultural values and nonns." 121 He envisions, first, an
"internal cultural discourse" in order to edge to the forefront existing
values that better accord with established international standards, 122 and
then "cross-cultural dialogue" through which to compare the results of
the prior process.
To be effective, this discussion must be conducted in good faith.
This means that the Western powers should "be open to a con-esponding

121

122

Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Toward a Cross-Cultural Approach to Defining Intemational
Standards of Human Rights: The Meaning of Crne/, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, ill HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS
19, 21 (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im ed., 1992).
"My thesis does not assume that all individuals or groups within a society hold identical views
on the meaning and implications of cultural values and norms, or that they would therefore share
the same evaluation of the legitimacy of human rights standards. On the contrary, I assume and
rely on the fact that there are either actual or potential differences in perceptions and
interpretations of cultural values and norms." Id. at 20.
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inducement in relation to their own attitudes and must also be respectful
of the integrity of the other culture." 123 The present regime assumes that
the practices and norms of the West set the standard that others must
strive to emulate. According to An-Na'im it may be the West that needs
to change its practices in favor of something favored by others. For the
call to human rights to be legitimate, they cannot be "something that
Americans .... take to others without allowing human rights advocates
from other countries to intervene here." 124
Under this plan, the dialogues will yield rules upon which parties
can agree, and which offer more guidance on behavioral norms than the
abstract principles that emerge during LCD distillation. An-Na'im
appears to be open to some irreducible remainder of cultural diversity
that cannot be mapped onto the existing legal regime. Even when
agreeing, for example, upon a standard against cruel, inhuman, or
degrading punishment, the specifics of what would be thus forbidden
"should be determined by the moral standards of that society." 125
Invoking a comparison that may strike many today as more controversial
than when he first offered it, An-Na'im suggests that:
For example, a North American may think that a short term of

·············· r1n:j36sonmenr1;;·me· appl'oiJffaleiJunisnmeiirr0r:·f11ett;·ancC\vlsll Hiat · ·
to be the universal punishment for this offense. A Muslim, on the
other hand, may feel that the amputation of the hand is appropriate
under certain conditions and after satisfying strict safeguards. It
would be instructive for the North American to consider how she or
he would feel if the Muslim punishment were made the norm. Most
Western human rights advocates are likely to have a lingering feeling
that there is simply no comparison between these two punishments
because the Islamic punishment is "obviously" cruel and inhuman
and should never compete with imprisonment as a possible
punishment for this offense. A Muslim might respond by saying that
this feeling is a product of Western ethnocentricity. 126

123

Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, l11trod11ctio11 to HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL
PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS 1, 5 (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na 'im ed., 1992).

124

Laura Nader, lntrod11ctio11: Registers of Power, in THE PRACTICE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: TRACKING
LAW BETWEEN THE GLOBAL AND THE LOCAL 117, 119 (Mark Goodale & Sally Engle Merry
eds., 2007).
Id.

12s

126

Id. at 38. Another example of the hidden ethnocentricity that can filter how we perceive the
appropriateness of certain acts is offered by Carneiro da Cunha: "In the sixteenth century,
Portuguese colonial authorities blamed the Tupi Indians along the Brazilian coast for
ceremonially killing and eating their enemies instead of killing them on the battle field or
enslaving them 'as all civilized countries do."' Manuela Carneiro da Cunha, Custom Is Not a

516

Wisconsin International Law Journal

Missing from the Western reaction is the recognition that the "religiously
sanctioned punishment ... will absolve an offender from punishment in
the next life because God does not punish twice for the same offense," 127
as well as an awareness of how some regard imprisonment as an extreme
and cruel punishment. John Stuart Mill argued that imprisonment was
worse than capital punishment. 128 More recently, sociologist Peter
Moskos has challenged anyone forced to choose between five years in
prison and ten vicious lashes to not opt for the latter. 129 The cruelty of
imprisonment becomes even less controversial when the damaging
effects of solitary confinement-a common practice in U.S. penal
systems 130- are taken into account. 131 Perhaps for similar reasons, within
many traditional societies "imprisonment as a form of punishment was
almost unknown." 132

Thing, It Is a Path: Reflections 011 the Brazilian Indian Case, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSSCULTURAL PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS 276, 293 (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im
ed., 1992).
127
Ahmed An-Na'im, supra note 121, at 35 .
1
• • •.•• •• .~.8,.•..John-Stuart--MiU,.•r:;;apitaJRw1ish111e11J,...(2.J. ..ApiciJ, •.11368),. jJI, IHE .. COLLECJE.Q ...\:YO.Jl,K,.s.. 0£ .. J.o.im.
STUART MILL, VOLUME XXVIII - PUBLIC AND PARLIAMENTARY SPEECHES PART I NOVEMBER
1850 - NOVEMBER 1868 (John M. Robson & Bruce L. Kinzer eds., 1988),
http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/262#Mi11_0223-28_621 ("What comparison can there really be, in
point of severity, between consigning a man to the short pang of a rapid death, and immuring
him in a living tomb, there to linger out what may be a long life in the hardest and most
monotonous toil, without any of its alleviations or rewards--debarred from all pleasant sights
and sounds, and cut off from all earthly hope, except a slight mitigation of bodily restraint, or a
small improvement of diet?").
129
PETER MOSKOS, IN DEFENSE OF FLOGGING 2 (2013) ("Think about it: five years hard time or ten
lashes on the behind? You'd probably choose flogging. Wouldn't we all?").
130
ALLEN J. BECK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, USE OF RESTRICTIVE
HOUSING IN U.S. PRISONS AND JAILS, 2011-12 (2015) ("Nearly 20% of prison inmates and 18%
of jail inmates had spent time in restrictive housing, including disciplinary segregation,
administrative segregation [largely nonpunitive ], or solitary confinement [involving isolation and
little out-of-cell time], in the past 12 months or since coming to their current facility, if
shorter.").
131
Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solifal)' Co11fi11e111e11t, 22 WASH. UNIV. J.L. & POL 'y 325,
333 (2006) ("[F]or many of the inmates so housed, incarceration in solitary caused either severe
exacerbation or recurrence of preexisting illness, or the appearance of an acute mental illness in
individuals who had previously been free of any such illness."). The U.N. Special Rapporteur on
Torture has called solitmy confinement for persons under eighteen "cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment [that] violates article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
miicle 16 of the Convention against Torture." HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & ACLU, GROWING UP
LOCKED DOWN: YOUTH IN SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN JAILS AND PRISONS ACROSS THE UNITED
STATES 74--75 (2012), https://www.hnv.org/sites/default/files/repmis/usl 012ForUpload.pdf.
132
T.O. Elias, Traditional Forms of Public Participation in Social Defence, 27 lNT'L REV. CRIM.
POL'Y 18 (1969).
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Against this background, the scales are not "obviously" in favor
of the West's preferred treatment of the thief. The argument by the
Muslim that amputation is more merciful than imprisonment becomes
less radical, just as incarceration may not be as enlightened as often
assumed. Arguably, imprisonment could be the more crnel and inhuman,
not least because it exposes the thief "to what the offender will suffer in
the next life should the religious punishment not be enforced in this
life. " 133 This perspective may be insurmountably difficult for the
Westerner to credit, but that is precisely the point. If one takes religion
seriously-as the secular West typically does not 134-then the priority is
clear. 135 Societies with different hierarchies of values, though, will reach
different conclusions. An-Na'im states there must be room for both,
because neither is obviously wrong and each lifeway is the source of
meaning for its paiiicipants. 136
Such emotionally charged examples demonstrate that what many
Westerners believe to be obviously immoral can be more nuanced. The
proposed dialogues, however, can shed greater light on what is at stake.
What the West may see as barbaric retribution that could be easily
updated with fines or prisons, may resist overt revision due to its
..emb.~.dde.dn.es,s . jn. n.a . . c:;oherent . . .religious ...and ...existential..context..N.When
change occurs, it will not come from demands from outsiders that
denigrate the sincere convictions of a people; indeed, such efforts are
133

Ahmed An-Na'im, supra note 121, at 35.
Only 53% of Americans in 2014 stated they thought their religious beliefs were "very
important," down from 56% in 2007. Importance of Religious in One's Life, PEW RES. CTR,
http://www.pewfornm.org/religious-landscape-study/importance-of-religion-in-ones-life/
(last
visited Feb. 17, 2017). See Press Release, Gallop International, Losing Our Religion? Two
Thirds
of
People
Still
Claim
to
be
Religious
(Apr.
13,
2015),
http://www.wingia.com/en/news/losing_ our_religion_two _thirds_of_people_still_claim_to_be_r
eligious/290/ (offering a broader perspective) ("The research discovered that the most religious
regions are Africa and MENA (Middle East and North Africa) where 86% and 82% respectively
of the people consider themselves to be religious, ... Western Europe (51%) and Oceania (49%)
are the only regions where approximately half of the population are either not religious or
convinced atheist.").
135
More could be said on this example, especially in light of the current negative reactions against
Islamic culture. Westerners may insist that intervention in such situations is exactly the purpose
of human rights laws. Yet it certainly should make a difference in that decision whether the thief
views the amputation as wrong generally, or only as applied in his case. The former provides at
least a prima facie opening for a human rights argument, but not the latter. For an example of one
man explaining why he willingly submitted to have his hand amputated, see INSIDE A SHARI' AH
COURT, (Films Media Group 2007) (seg. 44:14).
u• Ahmed An-Na'im, supra note 121, at 24 ("Enlightened ethnocentricity would therefore concede
the right of others to be 'different,' whether as members of another society or as individuals
within the same society.").
134
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likely to result in a renewed commitment to the rule as a show of
independence and group solidarity. Any positive refonn will likely be
through exercise of what Max Gluckman identified as the inherent
ambiguity of all legal rules. While giving the appearance of stability, the
application of rules can prove quite malleable. 137 Thus, while remaining a
formal penalty the amputation may, like the Judea-Christian's mandate
to kill homosexuals, 138 eventually become a never-enforced outdated
aiiifact. 139 But that transition must come from within, not under duress.
It is in this light we see how An-Na'im's plan is incomplete. As
a consequence of the embedded effects of cultural learning, 140
disagreements over specific rights are unlikely to be resolved easily
because changes may be tantamount to erasure of group self-identity. For
that reason, the dialogues he requires are vulnerable to becoming locked.
Each side will view its own preferences as "natural" and "self-evident,"
not sufficiently arbitraiy to be open to negotiation much less discard.
Without a means to resolve this dialogic impasse, the project is
prone to collapse into the current system in which disagreements are
resolved in favor of those better able to impose their viewpoints through
economic or military persuasions. Demands under threat of censure from
~;ic\S£IDf:J1ttmY~!"§Jl§ILfil!tl:\!1§Qf s!iWYtt:If:§()J!li,i()lJ. m:e igf~ri91: t() ()Ile t]1a~
frames the reasons for change in terms of local values. If, for example, a
human rights nonn emerges against capital punishment, the rule can be
strengthened by linking it to a society's existing values promoting

137

138

139

140

MAX GLUCKMAN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS AMONG THE BAROTSE OF NORTHERN RHODESIA 326
(1955) ("The varied flexibility of the key concepts of Lozi law and ethics is one of their
attributes as instruments of argument. It enables the law to cover various situations and to
develop so that it can accommodate social change. In this way the law in general is channeled
through law in action to cover the infinite variety of situations in social life. Each legal ruling is
united to its situation of dispute: it is stated in terms of fixed principles."). See also Stephen
Sedley, Human Rights: A Twenty-First Centlll)' Agenda, 1995 PUB. L. 386, 387 (1995) ("Law
spends its life stretched on the rack between certainty and adaptability, sometimes groaning
audibly but mostly maintaining the stoical appearance of steady unifonnity which public
confidence demands. But lest the mask become the face, it is important that new generations of
lawyers should become actively curious about why the certainties of the law themselves change
constantly.").
Leviticus 20: 13 ("If a man has sexual relations with a man as one does with a woman, both of
them have done what is detestable. They are to be put to death; their blood will be on their own
heads.").
INSIDE A SHARI'AH COURT, supra note 135, at 45:38 ("In Gusau prison no one is currently
waiting to have their hand cut off. I was told that in other states they're sent to prison for a few
years to await the amputation and then quietly released.").
See discussion supra Section II.B.
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redemption and discouraging vengeance than through rebukes and
accusations of savagery from foreign powers.
D. PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION
The description of the human rights bureaucracy highlights its
top-down procedures with formal organizations articulating what shall be
the human rights. These conclusions are then evangelized outward, often
resulting in attempts to instruct peoples about their rights, not
infrequently against their will. The limitations of the human rights
system, and the anthropological realities outlined earlier, suggest the
following amendments to the ways in which candidate human rights are
identified. The proposal satisfies Waldron's hope for a compromise
between the umesolved search for abstract foundations and the pragmatic
acceptance of the current legal regime.
Step 1: Determine the Cross-Cultural LCD
The LCD technique modeled by Renteln should be employed to identifo
···· . . .what. no1qns·peoples·Pecognize:fi'om4he··hPoadesF·.r<:tngeofeultural·· ·
contexts possible.

Selecting the investigatory staiiing point is important. Renteln
already had in hand a hypothetical rule-the proportionality of
punishment-when she began her review. The sources of these initial
statements can vary, but they are likely to include various versions of
existing ethical, moral, and religious standards. The LCD process,
therefore, is not a de nova inqui1y, but uses the outputs of other
procedures as inputs for its own examination, verification, and when
needed, restatement of general rules of conduct.
Results from the LCD survey will be mapped onto the rules of
international law. Those finding matches would be the most prototypical
of the human rights.

In the mapping we are not looking for direct correspondences.
Renteln does not require that there be a one-to-one relationship, but only
that there be enough of an overlap such that the formal rule can be linked
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to preexisting values with or without the assistance of bridging
notions. 141
The LCD goal is that an identified human right be capable of
recognition within local value systems. 142 Cunent rights that cannot be
associated with LCD norms should be reevaluated for their suitability as
human rights. Demotion from the status of human right does not require
that the goal be abandoned. In keeping with Raz's concern to distinguish
rights and values, failure to be a right means only that the norm should
be advanced through other channels, by other arguments.
Step 2: Resolve Cross-Cultural Disagreement through Dialogue

Although An-Na'im offers his cross-cultural legitimacy
approach as an alternative to the LCD method for creating consensus on
the catalog of human rights, 143 his own description assumes the existence
of that foundation: "despite their apparent peculiarities and diversity,
human beings and societies ,share certain fundamental interests, concerns,
qualities, traits, and values that can be identified and articulated as the
144
framework for a common 'culture' of universal human rights."
.Thei:efore, ..ratheLJha1L.an .a.ltemaJi:x:e, . hi§ . . JJ1J1JhQdJ1hm1Jd. J'lt:L.f!PRJ.i~cl.. tg
further refine the norms identified through the LCD method and mapped
onto the current rules.
In the likely eventuality that the LCD method ident(fies disparate
versions of a focal norm, the variability of normative opinions must be
reasonably resolved before the mapping onto current rules can occur.
Through dialogue a consensus emerges that adequately captures the
range of opinion. 145

141

142

143

144
145

Cf Griffin, supra note 42, at 557 ("[F]or a pair of values to be commensurable in this sense,
there must be a bridging notion in terms of which the comparison between them can be made.").
Cf MERRY, supra note 96, at I (2006) ("In order for human rights ideas to be effective, however,
they need to be translated into local terms and situated within local contexts of power and
meaning.").
See Ahmed An-Na'im, supra note 121, at 21. ("Instead of being content with the existing least
common denominator, I propose to broaden and deepen universal consensus on the formulation
and implementation of human rights through internal reinterpretation of, and cross-cultural
dialogue about, the meaning and implications of basic human values and norms.").
Id.

Some may object that seeking to find a single position on a value does a disservice to the
complex multivocality associated with such important issues. That is hue, but at least now the
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This process may not always be feasible within large
heterogeneous groups but can be effective in smaller indigenous societies
whose voice An-Na'im hopes to capture.

After the mapping of norms fi'om multiple societies, the resulting list may
display considerable variety. The final step looks to ascertain whether
the range reflects only reasonable variation of the existing rule, or
whether it contains substantive differences. In the latter situation a new
semantic center must be sought, in which case the current rule will need
to be revised or replaced.
While the Step 1 itemization of the LCD is a comparatively
straightforward empirical question (what do people believe and value,
and how does this comport with actual behaviors), the second step
involves finding consensus among competing alternatives. An-Na'im
does not describe how such conversations would proceed. From the
earlier discussion of the psychology of enculturated norms we can expect
that when two societies differ on a fundamental value they will not easily
relinquish their own traditional ways of life. This resistance is not always
out of stubbornness or political gamesmanship. Necessarily the focus is

· 0n··tnehas1c····:varues 0reacli society,····s1giiificanf ··clianges···1ii :Whicil····c;ali···
threaten the coherence of the group's understanding of itself and its place
in the world. Because all parties are instinctively protective of their
fundamental values, talks could quickly become frozen as each merely
reasserts the self-evident reasonableness of its own position.
To increase the likelihood of productive outcomes, the process
requires an external standard whereby some choices can be judged more
acceptable than others because they better respect even more basic values
or because they make other desired outcomes more likely. That standard
must be shared by all societies, otherwise its introduction risks merely
pushing back the impasse. Such a standard may not mechanically
determine the debate's outcome, but it could beneficially provide a
shared vocabulary for the conversation so that incommensurable
positions can be considered from a new perspective. An-Na'im's
proposal sparks optimism, but only to the extent that we are able to
tentatively identify an evaluative standard that could fill this unique role.

uniform mle is one rooted in the local reality, rather than the transplanted mle that was enacted
without their input.
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To find a suitable candidate by which to evaluate the proposed
human rights, recall the anecdote mentioned earlier from the drafting
history of the UDHR. Disparate countries were able to agree on the list
of human rights only because they did not discuss why they supported
those decisions. 146 It can be argued-in a version of the LCD analysisthat each delegate found the items acceptable (or at least not wholly
objectionable) because they compmied with what would on balance be
equitable or fair for their interests. They got at least as much as they
gave, and on the points that they lost, nothing central was sacrificed.
Conceived in these familiar economic terms, in-esolvable philosophical
differences could be avoided and result in a good bargain. The UDHR
passed the United Nations General Assembly with only seven
abstentions. 147 If this rendering accurately captures the underlying
motivations that made the UDHR possible, then our intrinsic judgments
on whether a specific situation is "fair" may be able to serve as the
independent standard required to make An-Na'im's cross-cultural
dialogues productive.

IV.

FAIRNESS:

A SHARED INTUITION 148

For cross-cultural dialogues on fundamental values to produce a
consensus position, an independent standard that can impartially critique
or rank the options will be necessaiy. To do its work, the standard must
exist in all societies, otherwise its use would reintroduce the
disagreement over basic values it was intended to resolve.
One possibility that at least has the required morphology is the
intuition regarding fairness. A sense of fairness is possessed by all
humans and represents perhaps the most elemental of our moral
judgments. Ethological, 149 ethnological, 150 and human developmental

146

147
148

149

See discussion supra Section H.B. See also ROBERTS, supra note 5, at 126 ("[C]reating a human
rights treaty would be virtually impossible if discussions of theory and metaphysics were
permitted at the drafting table").
GLENDON, supra note 91, at 162.
Many ideas in this section are developed in more detail by Donovan. See James M. Donovan,
Reciprocity as a Species of Fairness: Completing Malinowski's The01y of Law, in BRONISLAW
MALINOWSKI'S CONCEPT OF LAW (Mateusz Sh;pien ed., 2016); James M. Donovan, Half-Baked:

The Demand by For-Profit Businesses for Religious Exemptions from Selling to Same-Sex
Couples, 49 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 39 (2016).
E.g., Sarah Brosnan & Frans de Waal, Monkeys Reject Unequal Pay, 425 NATURE 297 (2003);
Sarah Brosnan, Nonhuman Species' Reactions to Inequity and Their Implications for Fairness,
19 Soc. JUST. RES. 153 (2006).
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studies 151 ove1whelmingly point to the conclusion that the ability to
notice an inequitable distribution of resources is deeply rooted in the
evolutionary histories of all cooperative species, including Homo
sapiens. Such results support a conclusion that fairness evaluations are a
human universal. While some disagreement across cultures about what is
"fair" would not be impossible, 152 since the categmy itself is already
shared, the assessment can serve as a common metric against which to
conduct the cross-cultural dialogues that An-Na'im envisioned.
A. ANATURALHISTORYOFFAIRNESS
In order to determine whether fairness can serve in the needed
role of tie-breaker, we must attempt a firmer grasp of what it means to
describe an arrangement as "fair."
For some, fairness may be a synonym for justice, in which case
the claim here appears circular. Human rights are creatures of the law,
and thus serve the interests of international justice. Disagreements over
human rights cannot be resolved by appeal to the same principles being
argued over. But excepting the limited circumstances described by
Rawls?s.0riginal·c0nditi0n;···behind·thevei:lof·ignorance;!~}.justice·i~not

usually fairness. In some casual uses they are loosely interchangeable,
yet in principle justice and fairness promote different ends.
Among the world's cultures the distinction between the two
concepts is widely recognized. As Gluckman found, justice is often what

150

151

152

153

Using versions of the Ultimatum Game, fieldworkers have demonstrated that fairness
determinations are present in all societies. While the results show cultural variability on how
fairness is defined, "this variation coffelates with differences in patterns of interaction found in
everyday life." Joseph Heinrich et al., I11troductio11 and Guide to the Volume to FOUNDATIONS OF
HUMAN SOCIALITY: ECONOMIC EXPERIMENTS AND ETHNOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE FROM FIFTEEN
SMALL-SCALE SOCIETIES 5 (Joseph Heinrich et al. eds., 2004).
"The reaction of children to perceived unfairness shows how deeply seated these sentiments are,
and the egalitarianism of hunter-gatherers suggests its long history." FRANS DEWAAL, THE AGE
OF EMPATHY 184 (2009).
Heinrich et al., supra note 55, at 49-50 ("We summarize our results as follows. First, the
selfishness axiom is not supported in any society studied, and the canonical model fails in a
variety of new ways. Second, there is considerably more behavioral variability across groups
than had been found in previous research. Third, group-level differences in economic
organization and the degree of Market Integration explain a substantial portion of the behavioral
variation across societies .... ; Fourth, individual-level economic and demographic variables do
not explain behavior either within or across groups. Fifth, behavior in the experiments is
generally consistent with economic patterns of evetyday life in these societies. ").
See John RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, A RESTATEMENT (2001).
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we wish for our enemies, while fairness is what we hope for ourselves. 154
In this rudimentary sense, justice refers to the coldly impartial
application of general rules, while fairness attends generously to the
specific facts of a particular conflict. 155 Justice is blind; fairness notices
the things we care about.
Although both justice and fairness play similar roles within
systems of dispute resolution, even here they differ qualitatively. Justice
takes the short view, demanding that the scales be balanced immediately;
fairness tends toward the long view, taking note of how the parties will
need to maintain relationships in the future. Justice is a non-iterative
exchange between strangers, while fairness allows for a short-tenn
imbalance in light of long-term interests of an ongoing relationship. 156
The basis for an idea of fairness is given through its roots in
market economics. "Fair" in this view refers to the primaiy experience of
entitlement and desert from ownership and exchange. This is the innate
sense of knowing how much grain to give in exchange for some cattle.
At some point the traders will agree on a given amount as being
acceptable to both-otherwise one or the other will walk away and find a
new partner. That mutually agreeable price we describe as fair, meaning
. onethatFsatisfiesrboth.bargainexs....
Underlying the process is an understanding that the grain is
"mine" and the cattle is "yours," and that neither of us can take what
belongs to the other without his agreement. Without those boundaries,
there does not exist sufficient distinction between us to make the
exchange possible. Once the distinction between self and other has been
acquired in this core sense, the rudirnentaiy ideas of entitlement and
desert built out of tangible property for exchange-of recognizing what
is mine, and that I control its disposition and can command a price to

154

155

156

GLUCKMAN, supra note 137, at 55 ("Matters of property-rights, contract or injury in pennanent
multiplex relationships require reconciliation; the same matters between strangers do not.").
The tension between the two can be plainly illustrated in the disagreement about the correct
outcome in Fuller's hypothetical of "The Case of the Speluncean Explorers." Should the trapped
cave explorers be convicted of murder after cannibalizing their companion in order to survive, or
should the extreme circumstances of the act serve as an excuse? Justice argues for the strict
application of the formal rule against the willful taking of another's life; fairness advocates a
more lenient judgment due to the special circumstances in which the defendants found
themselves. Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Spe/uncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616 (1949).
Cf. Laura Nader & Harry F. Todd Jr., Introduction: The Disputing Process to THE DISPUTING
PROCESS-LAW IN TEN SOCIETIES 13 (Laura Nader & Harry F. Todd Jr. eds., 1978)
("Relationships that are multiplex and involve many interests demand ce11ain kinds of
settlement, such as compromise, which will allow the relations to continue.").
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surrender that control-can be analogically extended to other kinds of
prope1iy, both real and metaphorical. This foundation is preserved in the
background awareness of a right as an entitlement, as something that one
is owed by another.
The analogic economic foundations of self and property suffice
to explain why I believe that I have rights whose transgression I describe
as unfair. Further steps, however, are required to account for the
recognition that others besides myself are entitled to this same respect.
As noted earlier, human rights as a distinct category of thought emerged
in the eighteenth century in documents such as the US Bill of Rights and
the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen. Lynn Hunt
connects these events with a sea-change of psychological perspective
that arose from the rise of popular reading of novels and other literature.
Reading accounts of torture or epistolaty novels had physical effects
that translated into brain changes and came back out as new concepts
about the organization of social and political life. New kinds of
reading (and viewing and listening) created new individual
experiences (empathy), which in tum made possible new social and
political concepts (human rights). 157

:While her defense.Qf this .thesiS···iS···GOJ:Telatio11al, later research ·has feund ···· ·
the relationship she describes between reading, brain activity, and
empathetic imagining. 158
157

158

HUNT, supra note 21, at 33-34. Martha Nussbaum makes a similar argument. Symposium,
Martha Nussbaum, Exactly and Responsibly: A Defense of Ethical Criticism, 22 PHIL. &
LITERATURE 343, 354 (1998) ("And, following Rousseau, I insisted that where our society has
created sharp hierarchical separations we may well fail to have compassion for those on the other
side of the barrier. Just as Rousseau's kings found it difficult to see their lot in the suffering of a
peasant, so too we should expect Nazis to experience great difficulty in seeing their own
possibilities in the sufferings of a Jew. I argue that literary works can help us cross these barriers,
if they display the person on the other side of the barrier in a certain way, as a human being
worthy of sympathy."). See also Turner, supra note 86, at 506 ("Ultimately my argument has to
assume that sympathy is also a consequence of, or a supplement to, human frailty. Human beings
will want their rights to be recognized because they see in the plight of others their own
[possible] misery.").
E.g., Gregory S. Berns et al., Short- and Long-Term Effects of a Novel on Connectivity in the
Brain, 3 BRAIN CONNEeTIVJTY 590 (2013); David Comer Kidd & Emanuele Castano, Reading
LitermJ' Fiction Improves TheolJ' of Mind, 342 Ser. 377 (2013). Keith Oatley offers a summary
of this literature, from which he concludes that "engaging with fiction is fundamentally helpful
in enabling us to understand each other as human beings," which can explain the increase in
empathy that has had, as "[ o]ne of its consequences [the] acknowledgement of the rights of other
people, even when these others belong to different cultures." Keith Oatley, Fiction: Simulation of
Social Worlds, 20 TRENDS Coo. Ser. 618, 626 (2016). In this vein, similar reports describing the
changes in brain functioning arising from use of the internet bode ill for the long term prospects
for the ability to empathize with the situations of others, and thus for the concern with human

526

Wisconsin International Law Journal

This hypothesis fits well with the observations of well-placed
practitioners. Andrew Chapman, having served for many years as the
representative of Amnesty International to the United Nations, suggests
that "the real seeds of the human rights movement [are] a feeling of
sympathy for the distress of others, coupled with a sense of injustice
when governments resort to measures which invade the perceived natural
rights of the individual. " 159
For this description, Chapman perhaps relies upon philosopher
Richard Rorty, who, believing like Raz that foundationalist projects are
outmoded, argues that "the emergence of the human rights culture seems
to owe nothing to increased moral knowledge, and everything to hearing
sad and sentimental stories." 160 Rorty asserts that "the work of changing
moral intuitions"-toward the end of expanding recognition and respect
for fundamental human rights-"is being done by manipulating our
feelings rather than by increasing our knowledge" about what rights
"are" in the foundationalist sense. The Syrian refugee plight, for
example, was largely ignored until attention was sparked by the image of
a boy who drowned trying to reach safety in Greece. 161 We should
therefore "concentrate our energies on manipulating sentiments, on

. . . senti!.uental. ~ducatiQJi'.Jg . ..b.~tt.1<.:cju~rng§~ . .~x~xY@~.~.§ . . QR~llD~§s,Jq.h.11.mil.11 ....
rights claims. 162
As an empirical matter, this account suggests that the idea of
universal human rights will be most prevalent in contexts where private
property ideologies predominate, and where the individual has emerged
out of the social background as an entity of subjective awareness. 163 This

159

160

161

162
163

rights generally. The same tool that reveals the shocking range of human rights violations blunts
the edge of our caring. E.g., Daniel M. Wegner & Adrian F. Ward, How Google is Changing
Your Brain, 309 Sci. AM. 58 (2013).
ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS; A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 9 (2007).
Richard Rorty, Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality, in TRUTH AND PROGRESS 167,
172, 176 (1998).
Helena Smith, Shocking Images of Drowned Syrian Boy Show Tragic Plight of Re.fi1gees, THE
GUARDIAN (Sept. 2, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/02/shocking-image-ofdrowned-syrian-boy-shows-tragic-plight-of-refugees.
Rorty, supra note 160, at 176.
According to Hegel, these achievements occurred simultaneously where they happen at all.
G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT §40 (Allen W. Wood, ed., H.B. Nisbet
trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) ("A person, in distinguishing himself from himself, relates
himself to another person, and indeed it is only as owners of property that they two have
existence [Dasein] for each other. Their identity in themselves acquires existence [Existenz]
through the transference of the property of the one to the other by common will and with due
respect of the rights of both-that is, by contract."). See also Turner, supra note 86, at 499 ("The
concept of rights is thus still criticized on the grounds that there is no ontological foundations for
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in fact appears to be the case: human rights are often accused of being a
"Western" idea, as opposed to more communitarian Asian cultural
models that have not prioritized ownership by individuals to the same
extent. 164 The complaint against human rights as a Western ideal is not
that the lineage is inconect, but that being Western alone makes it either
right or appropriate for imposition on everyone else.
The uneven distribution of the idea of universal human rights has
been a fact retrospectively accounted for with varying success, often in
ways unflattering to the societies that lack it. The present model,
however, predicts that outcome in a way that does not disparage latecomers as being in some way morally immature. But as the following
section argues, it is not necessary that all societies have the idea of the
universal human rights, but only that the relationships contained in those
ideas reflect local values. Universal human rights can thus emerge out of
an environment where all rights are local. 165
B. THE FAIRNESS STANDARD IN PRACTICE

To tum panhuman intuitions into a referee for human rights
.dialogues, iti.s necessary to . . in.v:ert.the analysisrAlthough·the···literature····
speaks of fairness, what is being perceived are conditions of unfairness.

164

165

claims about universality, that it is an individualistic concept of western (liberal) philosophy, and
that it is covertly but inevitably tied to the idea of (private) property.").
See William P. Alford, Making a Goddess of Democracy from Loose Sand: Thoughts 011 Human
Rights in the People's Republic of China, in HUMAN RIGHTS JN CROSS-CULTURAL
PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS 65, 70 (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im ed., 1992)
("[T]he centrality in Chinese society of the notion that individuals derived meaning in life
through their membership in an intricate web of social relationships, rather than chiefly on their
own or in a solitary nexus with a higher authority.").
The emphasis on seeking consensus to identify hnman rights may lead some to object that if one
society declines to recognize a right, then that right cannot be a human right lacking as it would
the requisite universality. It permits, in other words, a heckler's veto on the identification of any
human right, and given the diversity of human societies renders unlikely that any right may attain
this status.
A possible response to the problem of the heckler's veto draws attention specifically to the locus
of the relevant fairness evaluations. The social recognition required is not what the rightbestowers grant to others, but what they demand for themselves. Fairness is, at its root, an
assessment of comparative conditions between one's self and another, and thus we should not be
distracted by abstract statements that posit absolute states without reference to the expectations
of the framers. If, for example, we wish to consider whether a right qualifies as a human right,
and find that a power-wielding majority in a society granted itself this right but withheld it from
members of other minorities, in our cross-cultural comparison it would be upon the former
allowances to the self and not the deprivations from others that we should focus.
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"Our instances of 'unfairness' seem to be much clearer, sharper, and
more concrete than the more abstract, aerial notions of 'fairness. "' 166
This simple fact has profound implications for the identification
of human lights. First, given that "[ w]hereas human happiness is noted
for its variety, human misery is relatively uniform," 167 greater success
will likely be found in achieving consensus on rights that seek to prevent
evils rather than on promote goods. 168 This practical limitation reflects
back to the original impetus for the human rights project, the crimes of
the Second World War. Given the elusiveness of the idea of the human
right, Hunt suggests that the only sure way to know "that a human right
is at issue [is] when we feel hon-ified by its violation." 169 Raz, it seems,
had a valid point when he favored limiting human rights to those
violations which would provoke interventions. He failed, though, to
clearly describe his argument's inevitable conclusions concerning what
kinds of violations those are likely to be. To the extent human rights are
intended to create a better world, they would do this by eliminating the
worst evils, not by promoting utopian ideals. 170 Human rights are the
floor beneath which state actions cannot sink, not a ceiling toward which
governments must aspire. These higher goals should be the commitment

....ofJoQ.J:JJlJ:'. .~JlfQn;;~(.t.Qixilxigbt§.Jf1Y~

§~~k.th~ . gr~.~t~§tJ!!1191J!1t()f c;rQ§§:

cultural agreement, human rights should be framed as negatives: what
must not be done, rather than as affirmations of what should be done.
We have indirectly seen the practical con-ectness of limiting
human rights to the prevention of harms. Tln·ee efforts to cross-culturally
identify and justify rules of human rights have all been framed as
targeting the worst of human actions. Renteln used as the example to test
her LCD analysis the rule of retribution tied to proportionality. An-

166
167

168

169
170

NORMAN J. FINKEL, NOT FAIR!: THE TYPOLOGY OF COMMONSENSE UNFAIRNESS xiii (2001 ).
This observation has a long pedigree. See Wilson, Human Rights, Culture and Context:
Introduction, supra note 118, at 5. See, e.g., BARRINGTON MOORE, JR., REFLECTIONS ON THE
CAUSES OF HUMAN MISERY AND UPON CERTAIN PROPOSALS TO ELIMINATE THEM 1-2 (1972)
("Ifhnman beings find it difficult to agree upon the meaning and causes of happiness, they find it
much easier to know when they are miserable."). But see LEO TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENINA I
(Henri Troyat trans., Mod. Library, 2000) ("Happy families are all alike; eve1y unhappy family is
unhappy in its own way.").
Cf Michael McDonald, Should Communities Have Rights? Reflections on Liberal Individualism,
in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS 133, 155
(Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im ed., 1992) ("[H]uman rights should be aimed at avoiding great
evils, at what Falk described as 'the intolerable,' not at achieving great goods.").
HUNT, supra note 21, at 26.
E.g., POSNER, supra note 4, at 7-8 ("Humanitarians should abandon the utopian aspirations of
human rights law for the hard-won truths of development economics.").
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Na'im examined the expectation that "no one shall be subjected to
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." 171
Handwerker performed a similar study to defend the proposition that
"[f]reedom from violence stands as an important candidate for a
universal human right." 172 To imagine a credible alternative phrased as
positive entitlements is not impossible, but these efforts typically come
not from those looking at the aiTay of actual peoples but from scholars
such as philosophers working in the abstract. 173
Some may wony that restricting human rights to negative
limitations would deprive many groups of affirmative protections they
require. For example, Article 2 of the Declaration on the Rights of
Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic
Minorities 174 states that:
Persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic
minorities (hereinafter referred to as persons belonging to minorities)
have the right to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their
own religion, and to use their own language, in private and in public,
freely and without interference or any fonn of discrimination.

Under the proposal, minorities would arguably lose these rights.
·It may be possible torephrase1:hem;····however, <rs ··negatives:·· Note; for·····

171

172

173

Ahmed An-Na'im, supra note 121, at 29.
W. Penn Handwerker, Universal Human Rights and the Problem of Unbounded Cultural
Meanings, 99 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 799 (1997).
E.g., WILLIAM J. TALBOTT, WHICH RIGHTS SHOULD BE UNIVERSAL? (2005). Talbott identifies as
the nine basic rights:
I. a right to physical security
2. a right to physical subsistence (understood as a right to an opportunity to earn
subsistence for those who are able to do so)
3. children's rights to what is necessary for normal physical, cognitive, emotional,
and behavioral development, including the development of empathic
understanding
4. a right to an education, including a moral education aimed at further
development and use of empathic understanding
5. a right to freedom of the press
6. a right to freedom of thought and expression
7. a right to freedom of association
8. a right to a sphere of personal autonomy free from paternalistic interference
9. political rights, including democratic rights and an independent judiciary to
enforce the entire package ofrights./d. at 178.

174

G.A. Res. 47/135, Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic,
Religious and Linguistic Minorities (Dec. 18, 1992).
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example, that the list of rights offered by Rawls 175 can be easily defined
as rules against interference rather than guarantees of enjoyment. The
Article 2 language can be similarly restated:
Persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic
minorities shall not have their enjoyment of their own culture,
profession and practice of their own religion, and use of their own
language interfered with.

The versions admittedly are not functional equivalents.
Depending upon one's theory of rights, 176 especially employing
Hohfeldian analysis, 177 the original rule suggests that in order for
minorities to exercise these rights someone must have a correlative duty.
Recall that this discussion began with Wasserstrom's definition, which
states that human rights are "assertable, in a manner of speaking, 'against
the whole world. "' 178 Given a right to use a minority language, the state
arguably has a duty to provide programs that encourage and preserve that
right and thus make enjoyment possible. The negative version implies
that if a minority uses its own language, the state may not discourage that
use-as has been done by the United States 179 and other countries-but
neither is it obliged to intervene to foster its flourishing so that future
··· · · meinber'sof'tlreminorttycarr errjoythe·sameprivitege·:···
Reframing important positive rights into negative protections in
most cases would preserve the principle interest behind the rule while
demanding less from the state. Many of a libe1tarian bent would
welcome such a structural limitation on the powers of government to
intervene in the ordinaiy lives of its citizens, even under the banner of
promoting their general welfare. The primary benefit, though, is that
these are the principles most likely to achieve cross-cultural consensus. If
we are serious that human rights should reflect the priorities and interests
of diverse societies, limiting the category to negative prohibitions
appears the best approach.

175
176

177

178
179

RAWLS, supra note 59, at 65.
See Leif Wenar, Rights, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Sept. 9, 2015),
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights/, for a general review of theories of rights, including
Hohfeldian analysis.
See Wesley HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS: As APPLIED IN JUDICIAL
REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS (Walter w. Cook ed., 1919).
Wasserstrom, supra note 6, at 632.
In one example in its past, the United States banned the Hawaiian language in schools in 1896
soon after it wrest control of the kingdom from the native rulers. 1896 Haw. Sess. Laws, Act 57.
Sec. 30.
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If human rights are limited to the universe of prohibitions that
must never be broken, the second practical outcome of the proposed
method is that, at the end, there will be few human rights. Several
authors, including Mary Ann Glendon 180 and Eric Posner, 181 have spoken
in this vein, urging that human rights are too many, too common, and
that as a result their invocation has become insipid and mundane. 182 Some
scholars view a restricted number of recognized human rights as a
reductio ad absurdum by which to criticize the effmi to derive human
rights from human nature. 183 An-Na'im pointed to this critique as a
weakness of the least common denominator method. 184 Still, the one
point on which both Raz and Waldron seem to agree is that the growing
menu of asserted rights is unlikely to fall within any sustainable or
credible justification for the category. The present discussion endorses

180

181

182

183

184

MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE xi
( 1991) ("A rapidly expanding catalog of rights-extending to trees, animals, smokers,
nonsmokers, consumers, and so on-not only multiplies the occasions for collisions, but it risks
trivializing core democratic values. A tendency to frame nearly every social controversy in terms
of a clash of rights (a woman's right to her own body vs. a fetus's right to life) impedes
oompromise;mutualunderstanding·;amhhediscovery·ofcomtn6tigf6tlnd:''):·····
POSNER, supra note 4, at 137-138 ("Give priority to a nan-ow set of rights ... This approach is a
dead end because the relevant rights-enforcers cannot agree that a specific subset of rights are
fundamental while the others are not."). See also Steven Lukes, Five Fables about Human
Rights, in ON HUMAN RIGHTS: THE OXFORD AMNESTY LECTURES 1993 19, 38 (Stephen Shute &
Susan Hurley eds., 1993) ("[T]he list of human rights should be kept both reasonably short and
reasonably abstract.").
WILLIAM A. EDMUNDSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO RIGHTS 178-179 (2004) ("So-called
'minimalist' approaches are perhaps motivated by the won-y that human rights discourse seems
to be on its way to becoming "a club too heavy to lift." As rights claims proliferate, the language
of human rights takes on unnecessary and unwieldy baggage of both nonnative and metaethical
kinds. Added normative baggage consists in the fact that with each additional generation of
rights consensus is left farther and fa1iher behind ... When human rights claims are expanded
beyond the reach of consensus, not only is the expansion likely to fail to win any effective
advantage for the putative right-holders, but the very language ofrights is debased in a way that
enfeebles protections even for consensus first-generation rights."
See, e.g., BEITZ, supra note 38, at 4-5 ("An extreme version of this type of skepticism holds that
nothing 'called a human right can be derived from human nature' because the behavioral
dispositions we actually observe in human beings are too diverse and conflicting to allow for any
coherent generalization. A more moderate position holds that the interests that are in fact shared
by all human beings are too few to provide a foundation for any but the most elemental
prohibitions-for example, of murder, torture, severe material deprivation . . . The result of
accepting this idea is not a wholesale skepticism about human rights but rather a skepticism
about international human rights doctrine as it exists today: its scope will appear to extend well
beyond what might reasonably be seen as rights belonging to human beings 'as such.')"
See Ahmed An-Na'im, supra note 121, at 25 ("[T]he existing least common denominator may
not be enough to accommodate certain vital human rights. This fact would suggest the need to
broaden and deepen common values to support these human rights.").
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that conclusion, and provides a rationale in its support. A small number
of human rights will be the necessary outcome of the described process,
and not an arbitrary nonnative limit.
The unfairness standard would be employed whenever
discussants prove intractable over alternative versions of a norm. The
different proposals should be evaluated on the degree to which they are
perceived as unfair. That assessment will not be automatic or necessarily
conclusive, but it does provide a different dimension for consideration.
Because all peoples innately calculate the unfairness of a given situation,
all that is needed is a good faith effort to reach the best outcome, even
when that is not one's own. 185
Invocation of background fairness considerations would allow
one side to yield on contentious points while preserving its primary
moral principles. Yielding would not come from losing the argument or
adopting a foreign value, but because the change in view compo1ied with
already accepted values. The spread of human rights principles under this
view is not a patronizing evangelical missionizing, but more a Platonic
dialogue like the Meno, wherein we are led to discover convictions we
already hold.
V.

CONCLUSION

While the motives to propose a universal moral code reflect the
best intentions, the project suffers from three shortcomings. First, it has
failed to adequately address the reality of cultural diversity. The present
international human rights law regime arguably favors normative
preferences of the industrialized West that are not necessarily shared by
all societies expected to conform to those standards. Second, the
formalized human rights treaties have thus far been demonstrably
underwhelming in their ability to compel recalcitrant states to reform
their behaviors, and third, the uncontrolled growth in the number of
human rights weakens the impact of appeals to that standard.
Although previously treated as independent issues, this paper
finds that these three limitations of the current approach to human rights
are in fact sufficiently linked that a remedy to the first will
simultaneously resolve the others. Paiis I and II describe how the

185

One can imagine that fairness evaluations could productively be elicited through a Rawlsian
thought exercise of applying each candidate rule to the original position, behind a veil of
ignorance.
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imposition of human rights values onto some societies may inflict
unintended harms to the extent that they undermine the justification and
support for human rights altogether. Against that background the
challenge is to find ways to realize the goods of the human rights project
without injuring those it intends to benefit. The goal is to build an
understanding of human rights that reflects the norms of all humans and
not a mere subset characterized by power and economic dominance.
Those who despair of a viable solution may take this tension as
reason to deny the reality or usefulness of human rights. Alasdair
Macintyre, for example, has rejected the idea of human rights by
pointing out that:
The best reason for asserting ... that there are no [human] rights is
indeed of precisely the same type as the best reason which we possess
for asserting that there are no witches and the best reason which we
possess for asserting that there are no unicorns: every attempt to give
good reasons for believing that there are such rights has failed. 186

This judgment is ce1iainly pessimistic, and arguably premature. This
paper offers reasons to believe that human rights can be a defensible
categ01y when they meaningfully reflect the norms of most humans.
Seetiofls IH and IV propose that 1.n orderto ·be 1.nitially categorized as a · ·
human right, a candidate rule must have analogues in a broad ainy of
societies as identified by the LCD analysis. Residual differences would
be negotiated through cross-cultural dialogue with impasses resolved by
appeal to good-faith comparisons of fair outcomes.
This process would generate a list of rights that will be
recognized by most cultures as being a reflection of their own values
rather than imposed under threat by foreign powers. The expectation is
that when societies regard the legal requirements as related to their own
n01ms, treaty compliance will improve, thereby addressing the second
shortcoming. This outcome is more likely because in order to achieve
consensus the rules will predominantly refer to the things that
governments must not do, on which most people agree, rather than on
what they should aspire to achieve, on which much more disagreement
exists. Finally, if the catalog of human rights is limited to rules on which
most societies agree, and which are therefore most likely restricted to
negative prohibitions, the number of recognized rights will be small.
Fewer appeals to human rights will make any that do occur more

186

ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 67 (1981 ).
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significant for signaling an exceptional and critical condition that must
be promptly remedied.
Rather than pondering ways to transpmi human rights ideals
from their native environments into settings where they are seen as alien
demands, the emphasis should be on translating the formal rules of
human rights law into the vernacular of local values. This project has
been at the center of work by Sally Engle Meny
Translation requires three kinds of changes in the fonn and
presentation of human rights ideas and institutions. First, they need to
be framed in images, symbols, naiTatives, and religious or secular
language that resonate with the local community .... Second, they
need to be tailored to the structural conditions of the place where they
are deployed, including its economic, political, and kinship
systems .... Third, the target population needs to be defined. 187

Through the method described, international human rights~once they
have been designed to reflect the consensual norms of the world's
diverse societies~can in turn be translated into local idioms, rather than
transplanted as an alien invasive species of values.

187

MERRY, supra note 96, at 220.

